Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1948

Cicero's Views on Historical Composition as Exemplified in
Caesar's Gallic Wars
Francis X. Dolan
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Classics Commons

Recommended Citation
Dolan, Francis X., "Cicero's Views on Historical Composition as Exemplified in Caesar's Gallic Wars"
(1948). Master's Theses. 142.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/142

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1948 Francis X. Dolan

CICERO'S VIEWS ON HISTORICAL COMPOSITION"
,

.

AS EXEMPLIFIED ItI "'-CAESAR' S
4

GALLIC

~

BY

FRANCIS X. DOLAN, S.J.

A THESIS

SUB~rrTTED

IN PARTIAL FULFILL1ffiNT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS
OF

,

FOR THE DEGREE

MASTER OF ARTS

.'
AUGUST
1948

·'
VITA AUOTORIS
Francls X.Dolan, S.J. was born
. April 15, 1922 ln the
,

,9 ..;

Bronx, New York Oity and recelved hls elementary educatlon there
at the parochial schools ot St. John Ohrlsostom and St. Nlcholas
of Tolentlne.

In 1935 he entered Regl, Hlgh School ln the s"e

clty and after graduatlon Jo1ned the Soclet, ot Jesus at the
Novltlate ot St. Andrew-an-Hudson, Poughkeepsle, New York ln
July, 1939.

Durlng his tour lears there he was academlcally

connected wlth fordham Unlverslty.

In 1943 he studled tor a

short tlme at Woodstock College, Woodstock,Karyland and ln the
same year transterred to West Baden College, West Baden, Indiana,

.

where he recelved hl. A.B. degree trom Loyola College, Ohicago
ln June 194..

He had already been enrolled ln the Loyola Un1ver-

slty Graduate School ln January.

~

Durlng the scholastlc year

ot 1946.' he taught Latin and Greek at the rordbaa Preparatory

,

School ln the Bronx, New York C1ty.

..

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • .
Progress of Latin Literature to 50 B.C. - Deficiency in historical compo,1~ion - Literary
significance of Gallic Wars - Cicero's criticism as norm for judg~ng literary value - Rhetoric and History.

.

.

I. HISTORY IN LATIN LITERATURE. • '. . . . • • . • • • . •
History as science ~d art -Concentration on art
in Greek history - cientific deficiency - Artistic and scientific deficiency in Roman history Rhetorical turn of mind of the ancients - History
and Tragedy - Subordination to philosophy in later Greek writers - Practical mentality of Romans
- Cicero's discouragement - Early Roman documents
- First historians - Antipater and Sisenna Schools give no precepts for history - Cicero's
precepts.

1

6

II. CICERO'S IDEAL HISTORIAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .22
Limitations of Cicero's theory - Occasion of his
criticism - Truth in history - Art, presentation
and style - Failure of past Roman attempts - Emphasis on style - Gallic Wars as a possible answer to Cicero's hopes.
III. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GALLIC WARS. . . . . . • . . •
~isputes of scholars - Opin~of Holmes - Motives of Caesar in composing -Value of military
reputation - Pompey - Not a moral justification
- Legal defense - Deliberate falsehoods - Sins
of omission - Ferrero's charges against First
Commentary - Answer of Holmes - Rauchenstein Cassius Dio and Appian - Santones and Tolosates
- Rhetorical tone - No need to lie - Not expedient -,Glorification of self - Partiality Admission of failures - Animosity - Credit to
Pompey - General credibility - Caesar's character.

28

..

IV. HISTORICAL ARTISTRY OF THE GALLIC WARS . . . . . • • • • 59
Scientific norms elementary - Artistic norms fuller - Genre of Commentaries - Gallic Wars not
complete history - Consequent limitations -

,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

CHAPTER
Chronological and topological clarity - Military
handbook - Livy - Plans d~s9ribed - Quo ~ quid
actum sit - Causes stated .~haracter portrayal Difference of historical and oratorical styles Purity of diction - Smooth and flowing style Caesar's periods - Participles for subordinate
clauses.

'.

V. FIRST ROMAN LITERARY HISTORY • • • . . . . . . . • . • 97
General conformity to Ciceronian norms - Superiority of the Gallic Wars to past Roman history Sallust - Cicero's praise - Explanation of brevity
of the praise - Caesar an Atticist - Literary
milestone.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

f

.'

INTRODUCTION
Although it is true that almost everrone with a high-school
course in Latin to his credit, has been initiated into the intricacies ot continuous Latin prose with Caesar's Commentaries

~

the

Gallic Wars, there are probably very few of these who ever regard-

'.

edthat work as lIore than a training-ground for recruit grammarians.

Yet no better proof may be had of the literary signlficance

of thls work of Caesar than an examlnatlon of a chronologlcal
chart ot Roman efforts in the field of poetlc and prose compositlon.

Such a chart shows that by the middle ot the first centur,

B.C., Rome had awakened to its responslbllltles as a world-center
of culture as well as of emplre,)aad had already made signlticant,
and not completely unorlglnal, attempts at ··lm1tation of the Greeks
in lIost of the literary forms.

Llvlus Andronlcus and N8evius,'-'

PI aut us and Terence had proved that the Roman could not only appreclate the humor of the Greek New Comedy but cOuld also produce
its own literary mirth-makers.

In lts lIore serlous aoments Rome'

had taken a glimpse at the world ot trageQy through the eyes of
Accius and Pacuvius.

In hls Annales, a century and a half betore,

.-

Ennius had lnaugurated the Latln hexameter.

Lucillus, golng

further, had created a new llterary form, the satlre whlch the
Romans could always clalm as thelr own.

A promise of what a

greater genlus could do wlth the rather unwieldy Latin language

2

.'

was glven br Lucretius when he explalned the causes of thlngs ln
hls great dldactlc poem, De Rerum Natura.

Catullus

notwlthstandl~

a rather ungraclous sllenoe on the part of Horace, had ln hls shor1
llfe displayed a remarkable and hardlf equalled ablllt1 to master
the wonderful11 varled Greek meters, and reproduce them in hls
own language.

Twenty years previous, ln 70 B.C., Crassus and An-

tonlus had yielded their places of honer as the foremost Roman
orators, to the ardent prosecutor of Verres.

In one tield alone

dld Rome lag tar behind, as Clcero himselt admits,l and as the
chronologlcal chart wl11 readily shaw, in the fleld of history.
For lt is a polnt of debate, whether Thucydldes or Polybius were
ever surpassed by any of the Roman historians, lt is certalnly
beyond dlspute that before the time of Caesar and Sallust, nothlng
even worthy of belng put ln the same class wlth their work had as
yet appeared.
It ls then this more lmportant aspect of the Gal11c !!£! ••
a llterary slgnlficance undreamed ot b1 the hlgh-school boy who ls
struggling for the first time wlth lndlrect dlscourse, undreamed

,

of, too, by many of our high-school teachers--that will tora the
subject of thls thesls.

Presclndlng tor the moment trom

t~e

po-

litlcal slgnlflcance of the Commentarles, a polnt which wl1l
1 Clcero, Brutgs, 228, ed. and transl. by G.L. Hendr1ckson, Ca.bridge, Harvard University Press, 1942. Also, De Leglbus, I, 5,
ed. and transl. by Clinton W. Keyes, Putnam's, Ne. York, 1928.

.,'
always be a matter ot dlspute, let us attempt to answer a que.tlon
whlch ma7, perhaps be settled wlth more

certalnty~

Can lt be sald

that wlth the appearance ot the Commentarles, Latln llterature
detlnlte17 stepped lnto a new

tleld~e.ireplaclng

the groplng steps

ot an Antlpater or a Slsenna with the contldent and more mature
strldes to be tollowed so successtully by Sallust, Llvy, Tacitus
and Suetonius?

•• the title ot being the
Can the Gall!2 Wars claim

tlrst Roman literary Hlstory.

That ls the question ot th1s thesls

But since it ls evldent that some norm els required tor decidlng an lssue whlch mlght well be settled b7 many equally probable lubject1ve interpretations, the question may be stated more
specitically in the tollow1ng words:

Do the Gallic War. meet the

requirements ot good h1atorical composition as thoae requirement.
were enuaerated by Oicero, with whom, according to J. Wlght DeUS-t,
-Latln literary crltlc1sm may be said to have lts real beglnningf 2
He waa, at any rate, a crltlc who tully realized the lnadequaoy ot
Roman attempta ln the t1eld ot history up to hls own tlme.

But

would he admlt that w1th the appearance ot Oaesar'a work a change
would have to be made ln the statement that to wrlte history llke
the Latlns, satla ~ B2R ~ mendacem?3

..

2 J. Wlght Dutt, A Llterarl Histor~ ot ~o.~ to th§ Olos! ~ the
Golden Ai.!, Scribner'., ew tori; 1'§3, 38.
3 Clcero, De Oratore Librl Trel' II, 51, introd. and notea b7
Augustlne-S. Wilkins, diarenon Press, Oxtord, 1892.
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Obvlousl, the solutlon to .uch a questlon wl11 be tar trom
easy.

True; we could .elect a tew brlet phrases

~rom

the Brutu.,

ln which Clcero use. Attlc•• a. a mouthplece to state what .e ma,
presume to be hl. own oplnlon ot the . excellent style ot the
~~

Commentarle•• •

How much truet we are to put ln these cltatlone,

however, as reveallng the true mlnd ot Clcero; and how much should
be attrlbuted to a d.elre to 'rub O&ee~ the rlght W&,;15 or, more
sympathetlcally, how much ls to be attrlbuted to a slmple deslre
to return Caesarts compllment ln dedlcatlng to the orator his

Rl Analogla--these are matters hard to d.cld., lnvolvlng as they
do a great knowledge of a troubled mlnd durlng troubled days.
thls much we can do.

But

Taklng the ldeal of hlstorlcal composltlon

as lt ls expressed by Cleero ln his rhetorlcal works (chletly ln
the

R!

Oratore, whlch was publlshed ln 55) we oan attempt to deter

mlne tor oUBselves whether or not such an ldeal ls adequately rtpresented ln the Galllc !!£! whlch Were publlshed less than tlve
years later, ln 51.

It ln his later rhetorlcal works (publlshed

after 51) Clcero glves his own word ot pralse to the Commentarles/
we wlll have perhaps a confirmatlon ot the view which holds that
objectively 'oonsldered the Galllc War, marked a real advance ot
Latln 11terature ln the tleld ot hlstory.

.'

It, however, Clcero

falls to hall the work as an answer to his hopes, we need aot take
4 Brutul, 262.
5 Ct. Albert Grenler, The Roman Splrlt, Knopt, Hew York, 1926,
221, n. 1.

5

that tact as a retutatlon ot the same oplnion.
thls last statement wl11 be glven ln the last

The reason tor
cha~ter.

Betore proceedlng to enumerate ln the thlrd chapter the pre.9 .,.;

else polnts ot merlt which Clcero seeks ln hls ldeal hlstorlan, it
wl11 be necessary to say something of the relatlon ot hlstory to
rhetorio ln Latin Literature.

Suoh a '1onslderation wl11 show

why, ln splte ot the stead1 advance of Roman orator1, hlstor1 bad
fal1ed to make a correspondlng progress, or to put lt another wa1,
why the little hlstory that 41d appear, belng so identified with
the oratorlcal splrlt, could hardly be distlnguished trom lt as
an lndependent pursult.

Thus we shall see the deticlencies in

hlstorical composltlon whlch were almost necessar1 consequences
ln an anclent state that was struggling tor polltlcal domlnatlon,
So, too, the ldeal
""'"
ot Clcero wl11 stand out ln bolder rellet when oontrasted wlth

rather than aimlng at an1 high culture mark.
the inadequate types whloh preceded It.

,

..

OlUP!ER

.'

I

HISTORY IN LATIN LITERATURE
. The students of scientific method have long discussed the
quest10n whether history ls a sclencj ' r an art.

Whatever ma,

be our vlews as to the practlea11tr of such a subject as a polnt
of debate, 1t liar at least be salet tha'l 1t servel to keep prom1nant1y betore our 8yes the two great requlslte. of all good historical compolitlon.

They have, unfortunately, been all too rare-

ly tound in that branch ot 11terature ln the tine proportlon that
marks the pertect work.

Few masters of .clentifl0 historlcal

scholarship bave been able to produoe the plctured page of the
artl.tic writer.

Though their work may de11ght the hearts ot .tu-

dents, the, are cavlar tor the general.

On the other hand, though

Macau1ay t s style was consldered a flttlng model tor the schoo1b07,
..,.
he was known to wink at the taots on more than one ocoallon.
is thls a phenomenon peculiar to modern tlmes.

Nor

It is rather a

weakness 1nherent in humanlty ltse1t which tlnds it dltticu1t to

,

comblne the exce11enoes ot two pursuitl-a painstaking consideration and

w.~ghlng

ot all the tacts, and an eftective and interest-

lng presentatlon ot the tacts when tound.

..

And so we tlnd that with the anclents too, the comblnat10n
of these two characterlstics ls also rare.

In the case ot the

Greeks, lt we exclude Herodotus and Thucyd14e., lt may be sald ln

general that there was a greater conoentratlon on ars than on the
researoh necessary tor good h1story.
did not 19nore.

The latter, lt ls true, they

Yet they were more apt to use lt as a sprlngboard

tor the presentatlon ot some precono!l!ed theory.

Francls Godol-

phln ls not alone when he aays ln regard to Greek h1atorr:
Yet so strong 1. lntereat ln tora &aong the
anolents that the lnterlor ~storlans are apt
to turn history into a serie' ot rhetorioal
dlspl81 pieces, bullding up an impresslve mass
ot antltheses and arguments trom probablllt,
to the exclusion ot the tacts, just as the orators argued ca.es trom probabllity lnstead ot
clt1ng the taots, elen when the tacts were 1n
the oratorts tavor.
Early Roman hlstory went to the opposite extreme.

Admltt1ng tor

the moment that the Pontitlcal Annals make up la preoious document, whlch constltutes the chlef and on17 authent1c source ot
our knowledge ot Roman bistory,·2 they oan,hard11 lnterest anyone
but the protesslonal scholar, or a man whose own v1vld

h18tor~1

lmaglnatlon oan construct tor hlmselt the background whlch the
reoorders themaelvea negleoted to portray.

They are desorlbed by

01cero as annale, Rontlf1cum max1morum, gulbus nihil potest ess, ,
inlucundius. 3
Later, however, when the Romans flrst began to substLtute
connected history ln prose tor these mere tabulat1ons, thelr
1 FranCis Godolph1n, The Greek Historian" Random House, New York,
1942, I, xvl.
2 Grenler, 106.
3 !! Legibus, I, 6.

8

.,'
work, as tar as selence was concerned, labored under the same
detects ot lnaoouraol (It not posltlve dlstortlon) as dld manl
works ot the Greeks.

Thus Nrablus belonged to the !!n! Fabla, and

hls work must have been, betore all,.,..,raanlfestatlon ot that arlstocratle prlde which Oato pursued everywhere wlth obstlnate hatred.

Even Ennlu•••• had bad to lndulge the genealoglcal fancles
ot his protector•• • 4 And hlstorlcal t';uth suffered Just as much
when Oato mentloned ln hls own work no proper names except that ot
Slrus, the bravest of P,rrho's elephanta.

But whlle we may sal

that the Greeks, ln sacrlflclng sclencs, had preserved art, we
cannot malte the sam. excuse for the Roman..

In the same passage

as that quoted above, 01cero despalrlngly aslts: Quamquam ex hl.
allus all0 plus habet vlrlua , tamen quld tam exlle guam lstl
omnes,5
How, were we to seek the tun4amental explanatlon for the
sclentltlc deflclenclea common to so much ot anclent hlstorlcal
composltlon, we would flnd lt to be the rhetorlcal turn of mlnd
wh1ch, though not, of course, pecu11ar to Greece and Rome, was
certalnly one ot thelr predomlnant characterlstlcs.

True lt 1s

that ln an age accustomed to the prlnted word ln book, magazlne,
and newspaper, we f1nd lt hard to rea11ze that the plac. ot all
4 Grenler, 151
5 De Leg1bus, I, 6.

,

.'

9

these moulders of public opinion was once chiefly supplied by the
spoken word.

If, however, we attempt to reconstruct these ancient

conditions, it will no longer seem surprising that for the Greeks
and the Romans rhetoric (which in Oup.~!ctionaries is defined as
the "art of discourse,lt) should have become almost synonymous

'.

with oratory,6 and that the norms of historical composition should
have been almost completely neglected? in a society where men were
more often engaged in the political arena 8 than in study or literary pursuits.

Vifhat James Shotwell says of the Greeks may with

the obvious 'changes be applied to the Romans:
Moreover,oratory in a Greek city, was a
real force. The arena of politics was hardly larger than the amphitheatre or the agora,
and it was possible to control it almo~t as
definitely by the voice and personality of a
speaker.9
As a natural consequence, even when men did withdraw from publi~
life to write history (a possibility more likely to be realized
among the speculative Greeks than the practical Romans)lO the

6 James Shotwell, Introduction to the History of History, Columbia
University<Press, New York, 1936, 183.
? De Oratore, II, 63. "Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne nulla
esse praecepta, quae in artibus rhetorum reperiantur?11
8 Ibid., II, 55. " ... nemo enim studet eloquentiae nostrorum hominu:m; nisi ut in causis atque in foro eluceat ••• II
9 Shotwell, 183.
10 De Oratore, II, 55. II • • • apud Graecos a utem eloquentissimi homines remoti a causis forensibus cwa ad ceteras res inlustres tum
ad historiam scribendam maxime se applicaverunt ••• "

.'

10

attltude they adopted towards their vork vaa far dlfferent tro.
the ac1entitlc vlev of the modern hlstorlan.

The dealre to per-

suade (often at any cost) found It.a ,vay into h1story as well.

An

it may not be aa14 that thl. "rhetoric1zing" tendency leaaene4
with the years, at leaat untl1 the advent of Polyblua.

For wlth

the appearance of laocrates and his cultivated style ln the age
succeeding !hucydldea and Xenophon, historlans became even more
loneerned vith the

~

which ls indeed a requis1te ot history,

but not as essentlal as the veracltas whlch they were often too
ready to sacrlflce.

If history bad freed itself from the clutehe.

at poetry vith the vork of Thucydides,ll it ia equal11 true that
it valked into the Jaws of rhetoric in the age that followed.
Thus Werner Jaeger says of Isocrates, the leader of the new move••• Hor can we trace haw his politlcal preconceptions altered his vi.w of the hi.torical facts which he urged to support them,
although it would be extremely interesting
to aee how, when historical knOWledge comes
into contact with his political interesta,
it is always ~Itory vhich ia altered, to
sui t his wish~

,

So, too, a pupil of his, Ephorus, "rejected the &deal ot !hucydides to keep bis apeeches cloaely modeled upon the originals.
He frankly made them up and waa e.pecially given

,t~

harangues

11 Werner Jaeger, Paideia, trans1. by Gilbert Highet, Oxtord
University Press, New York, 1944, III, 311, n. 102.
12 Ibid" 103.

,.
11

.'

upon the field of battle.- 13 Another pupil, !heopompus, 'empl07ed
all the artifices of rhetorio to seoure effect, -~ Greek Kacaula7
or Treitschke. 114 Timaeus of 5ici11 might endear himselt to the
modern historian b7 hi8 statement

th4t~'hi8tory

difter8 trom

rhetorical composition as much as real buildings differ from thoae
represented in acene-paintings,"16 and that Ito collect the neoessar7 materials for writing histor7 is

t7

itselt more laborious
than the whole prooes8 of produoing rhetorical 00mpositions." 1S
by the comments ot Po1ybius, he waa guilt7
of the 8ina he preached against. 1 '

But it we are to

Judg~

It would be well to state here, however, that this confusion
of the oratorical with the historical is on17 one of the causes
of the interior18 type ot hiatoriograpby ..ong the Greeks. Thus
we may have what Godolphin calls the " s7s tematic error" ot the

~

historian.

Th1a i8 the excessive use of a general principle 'by

meana of which he interprets events to the excluslon of contributing or material causes whlch should be assigned their proper
place it the interpretation is not to be distorted. M19 Herodotu8

.'

13 Shotwell! 185.
~., ls6.
16 Quoted b7 Polybius, Hiatoriae.12.28 a 1, ed. b7 Th. ButtnerWobst, Teubner. Leipzig, III, 1883.
16 Ibid., 12, 28 a 2.
17 tbId., 12, 24. 5; 25 a. 6; 26 b. 6.
18 ~interior·t we mean trom the scientific, not the artistic
or humanistic aspect.
19 Godolphin, xiv.
1"

,

12
for example, ln his deslre to prove the truth ot dlvlne retrlbutlon, gave a protracted account of a meetlng betveen Oroesua and
Solon-although all his readers must have reallzed
meetlng was a chronologlcal

lmposslb~i4ty.

tha~

such a

" ••• this meetlng vaa

so vell adapted to the reflectlons he wlshed to lntroduce on the
subject of the autabl11ty ot human 11te and divlne retrlbutlon

'.

that he felt under no obllgatlon to respeot the taot that the
meetlng was Imposslble."20

Thls explanatlon sounds tantastl0 to

ua who are aocuatomed to the exactlng requlrementa ot contemporary sclentltlc prooedure, but It dld not seem so outrageous to the
Greek mentallty.
Another tendency detractlng trom hlstorlcal aocuracy was the
contuslon of history wlth tragedy whlch characterlzed a great
deal ot thls branch of 11terature trom Thucydldes to

Polyblus.~

It Is true that Arlstotle saw the dlstinctlon between the two.
Hlstory tells what happened; tragedy what 11ght BaTe happened,
or mlght happen.

Whether or not the other Greeks recognlzed the ,

dlfterence is beside the polnt.

Results show that ln practlce

ther "felt that historr could profltablr emplor the devices of
poetry, even to deviatlng from exact truth." 21

.'

20 Ibld., xli1.
21 !:I: Ullman, "Hlstorr and Tragedy,' Transactlon of the
Amerloan Phl1010gical As.oolati~p, LXXIII, (19421; 27.

13
Without denying the importance of such factors as these in
the development of Greek history, we have limited Qurselves in
this thesis to a consideration of the rhetorical color of ancient
history.

We have done so because

thi~41s

a tendency that charac-

terized both Greek and Roman history, and not Greek history alone.

'.

In fact, the influence of rhetoric is particularly marked in Roman
literature (with which we are more concerned in this thesis.)
For this two causes are responsible - the political circumstances
at Rome up to the time of Augustus; secondly, the very character
of the Roman mentality.
We may sum up the first cause by stating that while the

Ro~

mans had found it profitable to follow the bad example of the
Greeks in distorting history, they did not find it conducive to
their own practical ends to follow the good example that the
Greeks also gave.

In other words, with the advent of Polybius

in the second century B.C., Greek history became more or less
subordinated to philosophy instead of to rhetoric.

We cannot say,'

however, that Roman history made the corresponding change.

For

..

while it "no doubt underwent the influence of the philosophical
influence of Polybius, and still more of Posidonius ••• !122 yet it
can still be said of the Roman historians that:

22 Grenier, 221.

r
••• on the whole they seea to be the pupils
of the rhetors much aore than ot the philosophers. History tor them is really only
a kind ot torensic speech, in which the narrative is the principal eleaent; the technical methods and orn8llents are the SUle as 1n
&Dy other oratorical work~.·~he political
passion by which they are animated and the
great part played by eloquence in Roman lite
clearly contribute to this conoeption. 23
The Augustan age waa yet to come.

.'

14

Men.could still speak their

minds in the Forum and in the Senate.

And while they could do so,

speoulative history was not tor them.

Jaeger

say~

ot real poli-

tical oratory in Greece that -nourished by the lite ot the Greek
oity-atate, it 41ed when that di8d. 124 In Rome politioal oratory
was to tlourish aa long as the Republic lasted.

And as long

&8

it tlourished, history would make little progress.
We sai4 that the second reason for stressing the intluence

ot

~ratory

people.

on Roman

A-

histor1~1ting

was the mentality ot the Roman

By this we mean that the errors or defects ot Greek

hi.toriography~he

·systematic error· ot Herodotus, and the con·

,

fusion ot tragedJ with history-oould hardly be the detects ot the
Roman writer.

For these are not the errors ot the practical but

ot the speculative mind.

The error ot the Roman is, as we•. shall

notice in the briet review ot their eftorts at history, due aore

23 Ibld.
24 Jaeger, 102; ct. Wllkins, 45.

15
to a utll1tarlan outlook. 25 The saae fundamental attltude that
acoounts for the ease and enthuslasm wlth whlch

R~me

adapted her-

self to oratory, also explalns her slowness to make any remarkable advance ln history.
As we have sald, 01cero reallzed how tar behlnd Ro.e was ln
this fleld.

All ln all the record was'l1one· too enoouraglng, for

him at least.

When Antonlus ask. Catulus,

~ualls

oratorls et

quantl ho.lnls ln dloendo putas esse hlstorlaa sorlbere' the
answer ls 81. ut Gra.ol sorlpserunt. summl.,.sl, ut nostrl. nlhll
opus est oratorei satls est non esse m.n4&ce•• 26 Yet we are
afrald that even this poor estlmate of Rome's historlans 1s a llttle more than they deserved.

For many of them even found lt hard

!2 tell lh!. truth, aa we ahall aee lf we look back now wlth Clcero
over the paat.
The account of early Roman hlstorlography ls well known.
The rellglous records, 1.e. the Llbrl Pontlfloum, Oommentarl1
Pgntlflcum, Fastl and Annales together wlth the reoords of the
clvle oftlolals, the Ooamentarll Kaglstratuum comprlse the earllest Roman h1atory.27

..

Of the prlvate doouments "ohlefly ln the

25 Duff, 148
26 De Oratore, II, 51.
27 Mirlon Dlttman, ln "The Development ot Hlatorlography Among
the Romana,· Olaasloal Journal, XXX, (1934-5), 287-300, glves
a brlef aummary ot Wlght Duff on thls subJeot.

,
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.,'
form of family cllronicles to gratify patrician pride by panegyrics
on ancestors,"28 we may say that when a man is "guip-ed by the
practical purpose of placing his notion, family, party or person
in a favorable light, It it is not to be;. '-6xpected that we take all
that is written in such documents without a grain of salt.

For

'.

after all, the writers followed the convention of composing them
with their tongues in their cheeks.

The same caution may be ap-

plied to the laudationes funebres of which Cicero himself has
said, his laudationibus historia rerum nostrarum est facta mendosior. 29
About the end of the third century these official and private
documents were complemented, but not supplanted, by the first efforts of the Romans to write connected history.

Strange ly enough,

Fabius Pictor, Cincius.Alimentus, Acilius and Postumius Albinus

~

did not write in Latin because, according to Duff, "the superiority of Greek authors to the official Latin records determined
that the first Romans to attempt connected history in prose should
use the' Greek language."30

To Cato, the anti-Hellenist, goes the

honor of being the first Roman historian to write in his

28 Duff, 86.
29 Brutus, 62.
30 Duff, 248.

na~ive

,
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tongue. 3l

Hls Orlglnes was a step torward beoause ln lt Oato rose

to a broader vlew ot Roman hlstory, oonslderlng

development ot
Rome ln oonnectlon wlth the other Itallan settlements. 32 Hls ret~e

action agalnst the Fablan propaganda,.1» omlttlng the names ot generals, etc., has already been mentloned. 33 MThe reason of thls
lt ls lmposslble to dlsoover ••• Dlsllke ot the great arlstooratl0
houses lnto whloh the supreme power val steadily being concentrated,ls a more probable oauae." 34 It ls, at any rate, a good lndioation of the lack ot obJeotlvlty in one whom Qulntlllan can still
oall the founder of Roman h1stor7. 35
The style ot Oato as well as that of Oalpurniue Plsa who
·ccnoelved the plan ot reduc1ng the myths to histor1cal probablllty,"36 is unenthuslastioally evaluated by Oicero 1n the De
Oratore:
31 Grenler (p. 151) ls wronf in saying that Oato had an immed1ate
predeoessor ln Fabius.
Q. Fablus Plctor wrote in Greek, and
was an earller contemporary ot Oato; but the Lat1n version ot
h1s work was later than Oato's Origines." Wllklns, ibld., 251~
32 Ohar1es Crutwel1, H6sto~ ~ Roman Literature, Ohar1~rlttln,
London, 1910, 100. 2!.uft, 251.
33 Ot. pageo,Sabove.
34 nrutwell, 95.
35 Qulntillan, Institutlon1s Orator1ae Librl Duodeclm, XII;' 11,
23, ed. by Bonnell, Teubner, Lelpzlg, 1903, 11.35 Orutwel1, 100.
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.'

••• erat enlm hlstorla nlhil allud nlsl annallum
contectl0, oUJus rel memorlaeque publlcae retlnendae oausa ab lnltl0 rerum Romanarum usque ad
P. Muclum pontltlcem maxlmum res omnls slngulorum annorum mandabat lltterl. pontltex maxlmus
referebatque ln album et proponebat tabulam 40.1, potestas ut esset popul8.ognosoendl. elqua
atlam nunc annalas maxlml nomlnantur: hanc s1mllltudlnem scrlbendl multl secut1 sunt, qul
nunc slne ullls ornamentls monumenta solum temporwa, homlnwn, locorum gestarumque rerum rellquerunt; ltaque quaIls apud a.Aecos Pherec1de.,
Hellanlcus, Acusllas fult a111que permu1tl, talls noster Oato et Plctor et Plso, qul neque tenent, qulbus rebus ornetur oratl0 - modo enlm
huc lsta sunt lmportata - et, dum lntelllgatur
quld dlcant!,unam dleendl laudem putant esse
brevltatell.

An lmprovemant, howeyer, both ln the artlstlc and sclentltlc
aspect ot hlstorlcal eOllposltlon was marked wlth the appearance
of Oaellus Antlpater and 8empronlus Aselll0 ln that perlod ot
Roman 11 tarature whloh we mlght say roughly·· corresponds to the
age ot lsoerates ln Greece.

,

Antlpater went to the trouble ot look

lng tor sources favorable to the Oarthaglnlan cause ln hls work
on the Punlc War.

Aselll0 gave the tlrst real evldenee ot the

attempt to treat the causal element ln Roman hlstory.3S Another
lndloatlon of progress was had ln the work ot Olaudlus Quadrlgarlus who completely omltted the mythloal perlod.

..

'fhls was an

lmportant step slnce lt showed that, lt nothing certaln could be
37 ~ Oratore, II, 52-53
38 Dutt, 263; Orutvell, 100.

f

.'

19

known about the past, some .en were at least resolved not to Invent thelr own accounts.

But J though the archalc s,tyle ot Quadrl-

garius tound favor with some, especlally Gelllus, no .entlon ls
even made ot hl. by Clcero ln hls

reY~.

ot the hlstorlans.

Lest we think that all the work ot this period showed steadJ
progress ln accuracy, lt will be good

t~conslder

three ot its more

well-known writers.

Valerlus Antlas, who echoes the note ot the

laudatlones

by hls partlallty to the Valerl1, has galned

funebre~,

through Llv,'s pages the "unenvlable notorlety ot belng the most
lylng ot all the annallsts.

The chlet cause of hls deceptlveness

was the tabrlcatlon ot clrcumstantlal narratlve, and the lnvention
ot exact numerical accouDts."~9

Although Galus Llolnlus Macer

clalmed to have used certaln anclent records whlch bad escaped aore

...

scholarly and rellable men than hlmselt, the common oplnlon ot him
ls that expressed by H.J.Rose, when he says "Bven the uncrltlcal

Llvy oaught hlm lylng ln the lnterests ot hls tamlly, and that he
should tell another lle to the enhancement ot hls own reputatlon
ls ln no way lmprobable.",e As a third example, We .entlon Sulla
who, llke Caesar, has wrltten Com.ntarl1 Rerum Suarwg but whose
antl-Marlan purpose, betrayed on so many of lts pages, deprives
the work ot the tltle ot hlstory.4l
39 Crutwell, 101; .Q.t. H.J.Rose, A Handbook ot Latln Llterature,
Methuen, London 1936, 202.
40 Rose, 203; Ct. Crutwell. 102.
41 Dutt, 254.

,
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To summarlze, up untll the tlme ot 01cero, there was lacklng
ln Roman hlstorlcal co.positlon, either are or veracitas, or that
flne combination of both quallties of whlch we spoke at the beginning of this chapter.

!he

deficienc~~

the artistic side mlght

be explained by the fact that the aore capable men were engaged in
the poll tical struggle - • f1eld open to all during the ti8e of th
Republic.

!he defic1ency in sCientifi~·outlook may bave a double

explanation.

first, we have seen that those who did give them-

selves to wrlting history were, for the most part, a little too
interested in personal motlves, instead of belng animated with
that zeal for handing down truth to posterity which 18 the mark of
the true historian.

Secondly, the rhetoricai education of that

time (at least untll 91 B.O., the ti8e represented 1n the De Oratore) ignored the norms for historical OOmpos1tlon,42 or presented
them w1th an oratorical flavor. 43
Was lt thls latter deflclency that 01cero was attempt1ng to
supply ln the second book of the De Ora tore?

We should not try

to exaggerate the slgn1flcance of a relatlvely brlef passage,
presented almost by way of a d1gression.

Yet lt 18 lmportant

.'
42 ~ Oratore, II, 62.
43 Ullman, 33.

,
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enough as

.&

piece ot literary critic1sm.

Shotwell calls it a

.chapter ot the history ot History in miniature, t~e tirst and
only one in Latin 1iterature. M44 Atter this briet treatment ot
the relation ot rhetoric to h1story

~·.....ncient

time., and with an

equally briet survey and evaluation ot the Roman historians serving as a background, we are now better prepared to sketch Cicero'.
theory - it would be too amb1tious to c~l it a philosophy - of
history.

..
44 Shotwell, 214.

CHAPTER II
CICERO'S IDEAL HISTORIAN
Although referencea to

hlstorlca~~~omposltlon

are quite nu-

merous in the essays and dlalogues ot Cicero, lt must be admltted
that most ot them refer to style rather than to method.

Moreover,

after reading his remarks (in the pass~;e from the ~ Orator,
referred to at the end ot the last chapter) on the lmportance ot
truth and accuracy in history, we find one or two other passages
which appear to contradict his recommendatlon.

In the Brutus, for

example, he states that conoessu. est rhetorlbus ementlrl ln h1stgriis. ut a11Quid dicere posalnt arSUt1us.1

Now if we reea11 the

narrow margln separatlng the rhetorlclan trom the hiltorian ln anCient tlmel, and lf We conslder the fact that "history vaa added
e1~

by some· to the genus demonstratlv¥!, the th1rd divlalon of

quence, Yand Clcero lnollnes to agree w1th them,·2 we oan 1maglne
the havoc vh1ch mlght well be oaused by a too llberal 1nterpretation of th1s lndulgence.

So too, when Antonius exolalms; Hlstorla

varo testls temporum, lux varltatls, vlta memoriae, "glstra vitae

.

nuntla vetu.tati •• qua voce a11a ni.l orator1s lmmorta11tati

.-

1 Brutus, 42.
2 Wilkins, 244. Ct. also Cicero, Orator, 37, 66, 207, ed. and
transl. by H.X;-Hubbell, Harvard Unlverslty Press, Cambr1dge,
1942; R! Oratore, II, 62 i l Leglbul, I, 5.

~

-commendatur?3 It ls4 easy to understand why so much ot Roman hlsto.

ry was unrellable.

But whatever may be the Inconslstencles, apparent or other~.

w1se, In the other passages ot Clcero, the part ot h1s work In
wh1ch we are chlefly 1nterested g1ves a br1ef but deflnlte concept
of what the historlan should be.
as follows.

The 0icaslon for the passage ls

Antonlus (whom, we may take as representlng Clcero's

oplnlon)5 Is telllng hls 11steners at Crassus' Tusculan vllla that

3 De Oratore, II, 36.
4 ~lntl11an 1. sometlmes consldered to contuse hlstory wlth oratory, and the text, "sed etfectlvae quoque allquld s181le scrlptis oratlonlbu. vel histor11s, ~uoi 19SUM ~ !! p;)te oratorla
m,rlto ponlmus, consequetur,· (-Ai-- rat.~ 18,
Is quoted
to support this Tlew. But we do not thlnk that such an Interpretation 1& warranted by the context. Speaklng ot hlstory In
another place (Ibid. X, 1, 31) Quintlllan·says, "Est enim proxlma poetls ••• et scrlbltur ad narrandum, non ad probandum; totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesenl$m sed ad memorl"
posteritat1s et Ingenll famam componltur." (Itallcs mlne.)
Furthermore, we must remember that the speclflc term, oratory,
was often used for the generlc rhetorlc, for reasons we have
trled to 1nd1cate In the precedlng chapter.
5 " •.• the De Oratore, where the conversatlonal form Is but a convenlent framework for the expositlon of theorles somet1mes from'
different po1nts of vlew, but as a rule unchallenged, 1n the
way of cont1nuous expositlon." W1lklns, 3.

..
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although history is an art comparable to oratory, no rules for itl
composition have been developed among the Romans because they, un·
like the Greeks, are not interested

~n

anything much besides the

.

~~

eloquence of the assembly or the law-courts.
give some rules of his own.

He then proceeds to

We shall first quote the passage in

its entirety, dividing it, however io,o three sections.
I

Section

corresponds roughly to the first requisite of history - veraci·

tas.
........

Section II

is subdivided into

corresponds to the second requisite
~,

-~,

and

dealing with the presentation and arrange-

ment of the subject matter; and b, dealing with the style.
I

IIa

lIb

?lam quis nescit primam esse legem, ne
qUid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid
veri non audeat? Ne quae suspicio gratiae
sit in scribendo? Ne quae simultatis?
Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus,
ipsa autem aedificatio posita est in rebus
et in verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum
desiderat, regionum descriptionemj volt,
etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque
dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectantur, et de consiliis
significari quid scriptor probet et in
rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et
cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicentur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res ._
gestae, sed etiam, qui fama et nomine excellant, de cuJusque vita atque natura.
verborum autem ratio et genus orationis
fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudicali asperitate et sine sententiarum
forensibus aculeis persequendum est.

~

,

~---------------------------------------.
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Harum tot tantarumque rerum vldetlsne- nulla
esse praecepta, quae ln artlbus rhetorum reper1antur?6
The qualltles mentloned ln the flrst
. sectlon are essentlal
~~

to the hlstorlan slnce they regard the truth of hls work.

Desplte

the fact that Antonlus says, "These fundamental rules are doubtless unlversally known, "7

they are the.vlrtues so often conspl-

cuous by thelr absence ln so much of the work of the anclent
hlstor1ans. S In the next chapter lt wlll be our purpose to cons1der how far these rules were observed by Caesar.

Has the author

of the Commentarles ever been proved gullty of falsehood?

Has he

always told the whole truth, 1.e., has he employed the rhetorlc1an's trlck of passlng over slgn1flcant facts to pl.O. hls own
poslt10n 1n a more favorable - or untrue 11ght?

And (slnce we are

treatlng of an autob10graphy) does the personal element enter so
~
much lnto the narratlve of that most extraord1nary and slgnlflcant
campalgn, as to magnlfy beyond proport10n the servlces rendered
to the state durlng those e1ght years?

In other words, what 1s

the credlb111ty of the Galllc Wars?

..

6 ~ Oratore, II, 62-64.
7 De ~~atore, Ibld., 62, transl. by J.B.Watson, KcKay, PhlladelPh1a, 1897, 112.
8 Clcero hlmself ln Ad Fam. 5:12 "urges Lucce1us to wrlte a separate hlstory of h1S-consulshlp ••• and to neglect the laws of
hlstory to the extent of glor1fylng Clcero a b1t more than the
str1ct regard for the truth mlght warrant." Ullman, 44.

,
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The po1nts ment10ned 1n the next sect10n of the passage trom
the Q! Oratore are calculated to secure not
or l1terary h1story.

truthf~,

but art1st1c

The f1rst d1v1s1on ot th1s sect10n - dea11ng

w1th the presentat10n of the subject',4Ilatter - emphas1zes two quaOne ot these, clearness, 1s an obv10us necess1ty.

l1t1es.
other,

1

The

the h1stor1cal sense of coherency, was never too apparent

1n the work ot the Roman anna11st.

'.

C1cero'i words 1n th1s passage

cons1l1a, eventus, causae, casus, sap1ent1ae, temer1tatla, show
that he is tired of the mere listing of events and desires something of the intelligent procedure of a Thucydides.

It is probab-

ly this concern for causa11ty that is responsible for the remarks
he makes on characterization.

Since men make history more than

history makes men, 1t 1s important for the historian to show how
the life or attitudes of men were responsible for certa1n act1ons.
How far these h1nts for historic craftsmanship were carried

ou~in

the Gal11c Wars, will be shown in the f1rst part of the fourth
chapter.

,

The second div1sion of this section (rIb) treats ot a subject most dear to Cicero, the style of h1story.

We stated at the

beginning of th1s chapter that most of his hints for historical
composition treat of th1s element rather than of method.

And al-

most all of his criticism of the historians before his time is
d1rected at the1r lack of excellence in this regard. 9 ·Style it
9 Cf.

~

Oratore, II, 63, 64; and

~

Legibus, I, 6, 6, 7.

.'
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1s," we seem to hear him say, "that will produce a work likely to
be read not only by scholars, but by all men of

cu~ture.

It may

produce something to rival the work of a Thucydides or an Herodotus."

Cicero was looking for a

hist'~~

that would have about it

a qua11ty so badly lacking in the work of Piso, annales ~ ex1l1ter scriptos. 10 Was he to find some answer to h1s hopes in the

'.

work of Caesar of "all our orators ••• the purest user of the Latin
tongue?"ll

The second part of the fourth chapter will attempt an
answer to th1s quest1on. 12

,
10 Brutus, 106.
11 IbId., 252, "Sed tamen, Brute, inqu1t Atticus, de Caesape et
ipse 1ta Judico, et de hoc hujus gener1s acerr1mo aestimatore
saepissime audio, illum omnium fere oratorum Latine loqui
elegantissime.'
12 There are other references to the kind of style suitable to
history which will be considered in the fourth chapter.
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true, mention the main charges considered by Mr. Holmes and summarize the conclusions of this recognized Caesarian scholar.

In so

doing the aim will be only to show the typical tenuousness of .ost
of the accusations of distortion.

But4~he

plan of defense adopted

for this part of our thesis is simpler and,we think, of equal if
not greater cogency.

'.

It consists in arguing from the circumstan--

ces at the time of publication, and from the motives of Caesar in
composing the Gallic Wars to the following conclusion: This work
comprises an accurate and credible account of one of Rome's great
military campaigns.

In other words, because of the absence of

convincing proof of falsehood, the circumstantial evidence to be
presented in this chapter suffices to give a prudent certitude of
the reliability of Caesar in this record of his successes.
The connection, then, of this chapter with the rest of
thesis is clear.

the~

If it shall be established beyond reasonable

doubt that the Gallic Wars fulfill the first set of prescriptions
laid down by Cicero for good historical composition, the conclusion shall be that this work of Caesar's holds a partial claim,Jt
least, to
name.

b~ing

the first Roman literary history worthy of the

Let us proceed, therefore, to the consideration of tne

conformity of the Commentaries to the Ciceronian norms for historical veracity which were quoted in the last chapter.
It will.be recalled that the first rule for reliable

h1story~

r

.'
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accordlng to Clcero, If, ••• ne quld falsl dlcere audeat. Delnde ne
9u1d verl non audeat. 3 Before examlnlng the charge~ of falsehood
in the Galllc

!!£!, lt wll1 be necessary to conslder what purpose

Caesar had ln composlng these

account~~~

For unless we are to as-

sume the falslty of the prlnclple, nemo g£atls mendax, lt follows
that Caesar wll1 devlate from the truth only when hls maln purpose
may be better attained.

'.

Now there are two theorles of his purpose

in writing this hlstory,4 both of which theories require an understanding of the politlcal sltuation at the time of composltion if
they are to be grasped in their full slgnificance.
Two years after returning to Rome from Spain where he had
been praetor ln 62 B.C., Caesar formed that strange coalltlon with
Pompey and Crassus - the democrat with the former champions of the
senatorial party.
ln 59.

Caesar, it was agreed, should become the consul
~

Thls he dld and ln that famous consulshlp of "Jullus and

Caesar' carrled through many measures ln favor of Pompey whlch the
Eastern conqueror hlmself had been unable to secure.

Followlng
J

his consulship Caesar chose for his province the governorship of
'3

3 De Ora tore, II, 62.
•.
4 X-thlrd theory, that Caesar wrote the Galllc Wars w~th a literary purpose alone (as in the case of the De AniIOiia) mlght be
oonsidered by some too naive.
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Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul - ~or a period o~ ~ive years.5
Now,

i~

it is true that most students are never taught the lite-

rary

signi~icance

o~

the Gallic Wars, the same can be repeated with

emphasis o~ the signi~icance of the c~~aigns which they describe.
They were momentous
~'!estern

both~or

the city

civilization) and :for Caesar

o~

Rome (and ultimately

hi~el~.

But although it is

true that "Caesar's greatest accomplishment was in turning the
face of Vledi terranean city-culture toward Western continental
Europe,"6 it is rather the personal advantages o~ that campaign
which concern us now.
Ever since the civil wars of Marius and Sulla, the army had
begun to exert a new influence in the state, an influence which
it would continue to exert in the days of the Empire.

"The sol~

diers would not fight for any commander unle ss they knew him well
and had served under him long, and unless they could expect

~rom

him the same rewards that Sulla had given to his veterans."7
in his own case a Gallic campaign skilfully conducted could
this very need, Caesar certainly realized.

That

,

satis~y

There was another

..

5 Suetonis, Lives of the Caesars, Divus Julius, XXII, ed. and
transl. by J.C.Rolfe;-Putnam's, New York, 1928, I.
6 Norman J. De Witt, tiThe Non-Political Nature o~ Caesar's Commentaries," TAPA LXXIII, (1942), 345.
7 M. Rostovtze~~, A History o~ the Ancient World, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1927, II, 129.
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advantage it would serve.

Although Pompey was a fellow-triumvir

Oaesar knew that the former was very anxious to be the first man
1n the state and was only biding his time for a favorable opportuPompey's constant changes in p&l~cy was sufficient indica-

n1ty.

t10n of that. 'What Caesar needed, then, above all was a military
reputation to rival that of the
Pontus.

conquer~:

of Syria, Bithynia and

And what more likely place to secure that reputation than

1n the land of the Gauls - Rome's ancient and recent foe?8

Des-

p1te all his excesses, Marius had endeared himself to the Roman
people by averting the invasion of the Tutones and the Cimbri.
What could not Caesar attain by subjecting an equally dangerous
host to the standards of Rome?
However, although we are the first to admit the personal motives of Caesar in carrying on the Gallic Wars, it does not seem
~
necessary to conclude that he felt under any obligation to defend
his war as a Just one.

The attempt to read such an interpretation

into Caesar's account of his campaign arises, we think, from our
own modern ethical standards which were unknown to him and to most
of the Romans.

In a discussion of ancient systems of internati

ethics, Louise E. Matthei states:

.'

8 Napoleon III, Julius Caesar, Cassell, Petter and Galpin, London,
II, 1865, 8-13.
!
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••• there runs throughout Roman history a belief quite extraordinarily strong that success in arms depended on the righteousne~s of
the war - not righteousness as regards the
justice of the interests involved or the
claims advanced, but in the sense of having
scrupulously fulfilled all',$o.e formal and ceremonial obligations owed to the other side,
most especially those involved in the due
declaration of war. 9
It is this attitude that explains how Cjesar himself can admit so
naively from time to time that it is for their liberty that the
Gauls are fighting,lO while there is a suppressed feeling of indignation when he tells of their frequent breaches of treaties and
armistices in defending that very liberty.ll

No matter what

rights the Romas had to Gaul, the Gauls should play according to
the rulesl
If Caesar was interested in proving the morality of his actions, he was not doing as good a job as h.e ordinarily did.

Tl'1\

truth of the matter is that his actions needed no justification in the eyes of the Romans.

His countrymen were rapidly becoming

empire-conscious and, despite th.e remarks of Suetonius,12 such a '
people seldom views with horror accounts of unknown native

..
9 Louise E. Matthei, "Ancient Systems of International Ethics,"
Classical Quarterly, II, (1908), 248.
10 Caesar, De Bello GallicoCommentarii, VII, 1, 76 , 77, ed. and
transl. by John Bond and A.S. Walpole, Macmillan, New York,
1887.
11 Cf. ibid., III, 16.
12 Divus Julius, XXIV, "Nonnulli dedendum eum hostibus censuerlnt."
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populatlons yleldlng themselves submlsslvely or bowlng perforce
to the new savlours of the world.

Both Caesar, the genlus, and

the freedmen by the Tlber felt that, "It was necessary that Italy
should be protected against the ever--'t1lt..,eatening invaslons of the
Germans by a barrler; and lt was also necessary, now that Italy
had become too narrow for lts population, that a fresh fleld of
expanslon should be provided elsewhere~~13
What, then, ls the personal alm of the Gallic Wars?

Havlng

excluded theprobabll1ty of lts belng an ethlcal Justlficatlon of
the war, there are two maln theorles whlch remain to be consldered
The first is that Caesar was trying to show that he was acting
within the letter, if not the spirit of the Constitution when he
undertook the conquest of Gaul and raised an army Wlthout the
explicit permission of the Senate. 14 The Constltution, it is
true, was rapldly becomlng an heirloom, but there were some men""'"
who, llke Cicero, concelved for it an impractical but sentlmental
affection.

The sensibllities of such men, in Caesar's oplnlon,

must not be too vlolently shocked.

,

The second theory ls that Cae-

ear was trying to augment the glory of his campaigns either in the

.'
13 Bryans, C., and Hendy, F., History ~ Roman Republic, (abridge
from Mommsen), Scribner's, New York, 1899, 393.
14 Theodor Mommsen, History of Rome, transl. by Dickson; Bentley
& Son, London, 1875, IV, 605.
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eyes of posterity, as Norman DeWitt holds,15 or, (as seems more
probable in view of his selection of Gaul as his

p~ovince)

in the

eyes of his contemporaries whom he was anxious to win over to the
"new Alexander."lS
Depending on which of the above mentioned aims motivated
Caesar in the composition of the Commen;aries, it seems that he
would be inclined to violate some of Cicero's norms more than
others.

In other words, if he wrote to give a legal justification

of the war, he would be apt to tell more falsehoods and suppress
truth in order to explain the "independence of home authority
which its author had allowed himself." l ?

If he wrote mainly to

magnify his own glory, he would be more tempted to use animosity
and partiality.

These defects are not, of course, mutually ex-

clusive but in a matter so complex as this, the following proce~

dure seems feasible.

Assuming first of all that his intention was

legal justification of the war, we will consider whether or not
his work conforms to those norms of Cicero whose violation would
better secure this aim.

,

Did he, we ask, deliberately misrepresent

the truth? "Having settled this point of the theSiS, we will then
assume that personal glory was his aim, and with this in

v~ew,

l5'DeWitt, 342.
16 Cf. Divus Julius, VII.
I? W. Warde Fowler, JuliUS Caesar, Putnam's New York, 1902, 129.
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will attempt to determine whether or not animosity or partiality
has distorted the veracity of his account.
But whatever view we take of Caes~r's purpose in writing,18
this must be constantly remembered.

It does not follow because

his main end is personal, that his work is not worthy of the name
of history.

Antonius says in the De Or*tore that his main purpose

in walking in the sun is to get exercise, but he also gets the benefit of a sunburn. 19 Similarly, it may well be that Caesar has,
incidentally to his main purpose, left us a valuable history.
cannot decide the issue

~

priori.

We

The question is whether or not

his personal aim has led him to express only the good and not the
bad, only his successes and not his failures, only his own contributions and not those of others.
Proceeding, aocordingly, to the first step, let us see if ~
Caesar violated Cicero's first law of historical compOSition by
distorting the facts.

Although the best arguments against the

probability of falsehood are to be sought in the circumstances at'

18 The question of the date of publication of the Commentaries
does not seriously affect our thesis. If written in 46;' the
latest date (because mentioned in the Brutus), the aim would
probably be that held by DeWitt, or an effort to conciliate
the remaining Pompeians. If written in 50 (Holmes), or before 51 (Mommsen) or during the campaigns (Long), the aim
would be legal Justification of the war. But in any case we
admit the personal motive.
19 De Oratore, II, 60.
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the time of writing and in Caesar's own prudence, it will be helpful before developing these pOints, to consider
20
main accusations mentioned by T. Rice Holmes.

br~efly

the four

As was said in

the introduction to this chapter, the,'.uffice to give us an idea
of the specific oharges of distortion.

Holmes' refutation of

these charges, together with the strong arguments from probability

'.

will lead, we think, to the oommon-sense view that, though the
Gallio Wars may have been written to Justify the wars of Caesar, i
was neither expedient nor necessary for him to depart from the
truth to secure this end.
With the last part of the previous statement the opponents of
Caesar's credibility will not agree.

In their opinion the writer

could have seoured his end only by tampering with the truth.

Fol-

lowing this conviction their next step is to ask themselves Whal
lies Caesar would have to tell in order to make the Helvetii and
Ariovistus the aggressors in the oontests whioh inaugurated the
Gallic campaign, or in order to give the impression that the Roman general was continually being forced to pursue the war.

..

First of all they say that Caesar imputed false motives for
the Helvetian migration and that he did not give his own real motives for attaoking Ariovistus.
•

20 Holmes, 217-29.

Caesar and the Romans were afraid

.'

that the Helvetians were desirous of founding a Gallic Empire, but
according to Ferrero:
There were no political designs in their trek
at all. The real center of political interest
lay in quite a different drrection. At the
moment of Caesar's arrival what really endangered Gaul was not the Swiss peril, personified
in the Helvetian trekkers, but the German
peril personified in Ariovistus. 2l

'.

Yet after thus emphasizing the German peril when discussing the
Helvetian campaign,22 the same author thinks that Caesar had to
"improvise" a war against Ariovistus.

For "no reasonable pretext

of war could be alleged against him. "23

In order to prove these

charges Ferrero used a method which "involved a drastiC reconstruction of Caesar's First Commentary.M24

Rather than repeat that

drastic reconstruction which is presented by him in The Greatnesa
and Decline ~ Rome, criticized by Holmes,25 re-presented by
Ferrero,26 and recriticized by Holmes,27 it seems more prudent

...

to consider the case settled for the present in Caesar's favor.
21 Guglielmo Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome~ transl.
by Alfred E. Zimmern, Putnam's, NmrYork, 190r, II, F .
22 The truth of the matter is that Caesar saw there were two
real dangers and, like the prudent general, diplomat and states
man that he was, dealt with one of them at a time.
•.
23 Ferrero, 25.
24 Holmes, 218.
25 Holmes, MSi~nor Ferrero's Reconstruction of Caesar's First
Commentary, Classical Quarterl~, III, (1909), 203-15.
26 Ferrero, iLe Premier Livre desommentaires et Les Critiques
de M.T. Rice Holmes," Classical Quarterly, IV, (1910), 28-34.
27 Holmes, "Signor Ferrero on Caesar,' Classical QuarterlY,
IV, (1910), 239-46.
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For the impression one gets of Ferrero's prosecution is this.
Making great use of the potential for the indicativ.e mood,28 and
acting on the supposition that Caesar had to lie, the historian
substitutes for whatever Caesar
thinks might have

happened~

said'~&a

happened that which he

The final result of what may well be

called 'Ferrero's First Commentary" is a confused drama in which
.

"

Caesar is making continual mistakes (but succeeding marvelously
well in spite of them), and in wh1ch the Helvetians go wandering
around Gaul, not seeking to establish an Empire, but prepar1ng to
attack Ariovistus and the Germans Who live in the opposite direction.

If Caesar lied, he did so plausibly.

But his critic has

put together a series of actions based on irrational and contradictory motives.

Moreover he has succeeded in confusing not only

his readers but himself as well.

We have seen one example of this

already (where he says that Caesar had to seek a pretext of
with Ariovistus.)

w~

Let us look at two others.

Discussing the General Assembly of Gaul in 58 B.C.,
Ferrero says:

28 His text and footnotes aboun~ in such expressions as: Id' it
not s1mpler to suppose (p. 5); Rauchenstein has shown the
frobabi11tz that Caesar is mistaken. (3); It seems unlikely
l5}; What exactly took plaoe we do not know {16}; Very likely
it was more serious than Caesar wishes us to know. (27). etc.
(Italics mine.)

40

.,'
It was hardly possible ·to doubt that this general assembly seemed in itself to prove, that
the Helvetian war had done more to inorease Roman prestige in Gaul than a generation of negotiations and senatorial debates.~9
But in the very next paragraph we rea4~the following:
••• he realized the full extent of his blunder
in attaoking the Helvetii ••• This oampaign •••
had oompromised the prestige of Rome in Gaul
and lessened ~Os chances in t~e war against
Ariovistua •••
The second example is even stranger.

Ferrero thinks that

the viotory over the Helvetii which Caesar desoribed3l was no
victory at all - because he deoided to rest for three days.32
The obvious question to this is, NIf the Helvetians really won the
battle, why did they ask for peaoe at the end of that time?·
That they did ask for peaoe Ferrero does not deny.

The following

is his explanation:
Tired out by their long maroh, and perhaps
somewhat bewildered by what had taken plaoe,
they had suddenly oonceived a fear lest RomS
might make them pay dear for their viotory_ 3

29 Ferrero, 23.
30 Ibid.
"
31 BiIIum Gallioum, I, 26, 27.
will be used.
32 Ferrero, 17.
33 Ibid.

-

Hereafter the abbreviation B.G.

.-

r
41
They must have been a strange people!

A victory so bewllders

them that they declde to surrender to the enemy

le~t

a like event

again befall them.
After considering such interpretation of the Gallic War, we
hold more strongly to the bellef that the susplclon of falsehood
in statements which were accepted by co,temporaries who were
competent to judge,~4 ls apt to make us not serious scholars but
senseless sceptlcs.

That Caesar lied is very possible but the

probability that he did must be proved by better arguments than
the preceedlng and those which follow.
The .econd charge to be considered ln thls thesls ls that of
the German scholar, Rauchenstein~5 who argues that the Helvetians
could not have attacked Caesar's entrenchments on the Rhone.~6
According to him, the incldent was invented by Caesar to make bts
enemy guilty of the flrst attack.

We may divide hls reasons for

denying Caesar's credibility into an argument from probability
and an argument from authority.
Rauchenstein's first argument, then, is that the Helvetii
would not have walted idly from March 28 (the day on which-they

~4 Cicero, Brutus
262; Hirtius, B.G., VIII, 1.
35 Rauchensteln, ~ Feldzug Casars-gegen ~. Helvetier, 1882,
51-54, (cited by Holmes, 224).
~6 B.G., I, 6, 7, 8.

o
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asked permlsslon to cross the Rhone), untll Aprll 13 (the day on
which Caesar announced the refusal of thelr
Caesar was preparlng hls fortiflcations.

reques~),

lf they knew

Our answer to thls ob-

Jectlon ls that the Helvetians dld no,t 'Jmow what Caesar was dolng.
For according to the aocount of Napoleon III, based on a personal
examlnatlon of the site by his collaborator, Colnel Stoffel,

37

Caesar's entrenchments could have beentuilt unobserved wlthin
three days. Moreover, neither the account of Caesar nor of Dio
Cassius 38 states that the Helvetlans actually waited a very long
tlme.

The ,charge of Rauchenstein is based then, on two false sup-

positions - that the buildlng of the entrenchments aotually took
the whole period of fifteen days, and that they oould not be concealed from the enemy.
Arguing from authorlty, Rauchensteln claims that Caesar lled

...

beoause Dl0 Casslus makes no mention of the Helvetlans attemptlng
to storm the entrenchments.

But an argument from another's slleno,

and partlcularly ln thls case, is no argument agalnst Caesar. 39
For Casslus was not a mllltary hlstorlan and so was very llkely

37 Napoleon III, 59 and note; 58-64.
•.
38 Casslus Dl0, Roman History, XXVIII, 32, i, ed. and transl. by
Ernest Cary, Macmlllan, New York, 1914.
39 I do not thlnk wlth Holmes (225) that Dio's narrative lmplies
that they did attack. But lt does not exclude that possiblllty either.

,
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to exclude or omit such a point, whereas Caesar was the military
historian par excellence.
We may take

advante~e

of this

.

ex~ple
,
;

..

to give a general ans-

wer to those who cite Dio Cassius and Appian as authorities against
Caesar.

They usually do so because the Greek historians often add

details which are not found in the Roman.s account, but do not
necessarily contradict him.

That is why it may be said, "Dio Cas-

sius is entirely at one with Caesar in his account of the Conquest
of Gaul."4o

The following passa~written by Ernest Cary, editor

of the Loeb edition of Dio Cassius, would help to avoid a lot of
useless accusations of Caesar:
Unfortunately the value of his history is
grea.tly diminished for us as a result of his
blind devotion to two theories governing
historical composition in his day. On the
one hand .•• mere details should give place to
the larger aspects and significance of events
••• On the other hand, the historian was never
to forget that he was at the same time a rhetorician; if the bare facts were lacking in
effectiveness, they could be adorned, modified, or variously combined in the interest
of a more dramatic presentation ••• A good illustration of the transformation the facts
could undergo in the interests of these two
theories is seen in his account of the conquest of Gaul. It is now generally recognized that there is nothing in this account
which need imply an ultimate source other

40 Teuffel-Schwabe, History of Roman Literature, transl. by
George C. Warr, George Bell, London, 1900, I 335.

,

..
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than Caesar's Commentaries; and yet were it not
for the familiar names, the reader might readily
be excused for failing to recognize many of the
events narrated, to such an extent has Dio shifted the emphasis of the facts and assigned new
motives while attempting to, ..b:ring into relief
the contra~ts between the Gallic and the Roman
character.41
The same defect is implied in Appian:

.

According to modern canons of criticism, accuracy is the first and indispensable requisite of
the historian, but it was not so in ancient
times. General conformity to facts was of
course necessary, but in most cases the aim was
to make an interesting book or to furnish a
setting for the political ideas, or the moral
principles which he entertained. Appian was
nei therbetter nor worse in this re~pect than
the average historians of his time.42
The third objection, which is simply stated and even more
simply answered, is based on the following passage from the first
book:
Caesari renuntiatur, Helvetiis esse in animo
per agrum Sequanorum et Aeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium
finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia.
Id si fieret, intellegebat, magno cum pe~iculo
provinciae futurum, ut homines bellicosos, popu+i Romani inimicos, locis patentipus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet.43

,

..

Caesar, it is charged, minimized the distance between the

41
42
43

Cary, xiii-xiv.
Appian, Roman History, I, xi, ed. and transl. by Horace Vfuite,
Macmillan, New York, 1912, I.
B. G., I, 10.
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territory of the Santoni and Tolosates in order to make the danger
seem more threatening to the Roman people.
is actually one hundred and thirty miles,44

Now

si~ce

the distance

it must be admitted

that the words n2n longe appear to be.&Yrhetorical exaggeration.
But if we use a little common-sense, it is obvious that Caesar was
not asking his readers to take on h1s word alone a fact that they
could eas11y prove false themselves.

• longe meant that s1nce

~

there was no m111tary barrier to keep off the restless foe from
the Roman territory, the enemy was 1n a certa1n and real
to Rome.

sens~

near

We might say that a Japanese colony on Hawa1i 1s not far

from San Francisco.

Caesar could argue from the past d1plomat1c

procedure of the Senate that 1t, too, thought such an enemy to be
a real threat even if it remained in Gaul.

For as early as 60,

Cicero states in a letter to Atticus that the Senate is sending
warnings to the Gallio states telling them not to Join the Helvttians who are threatening to attack the province. 45 Whether or
not Caesar was looking for a war is not the po1nt of this thesis.
We think that he was and that he had enough foresight to choose
this province for that very purpose.~

,

But we think, too, that he

was prudent enough to wait for a good "incident."

..

The Helvetian

invasion was an ancient Pearl Harbor.
44 Holmes, 226.
45 Cicero, Epistulae , Ad. Att. I, 19, 2, ed. by Louis C. Purser,
Clarendon, Oxford, 1903, II, pars prior.
46 "Although the actual invasion did not take place till 58 B.C.,
it had been long meditated, and was doubtless expeoted at Rome.
How,Cicero's Select Letters, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934,
II, 88.
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The last charge of distortion to be considered by us is that
the whole rhetorical tone of the Gallic Wars is that Caesar was
forced to oonquer Gaul.

But suoh an impression arises from a

false opinion of Caesar's purpose in',w»,iting his history. We have
given suffioient reasons above 47 to show that he was not required
to give an ethical Justification of his war.

.

And what, we ask, in

the Gallic Wars is to make us believe that he was attempting to do
so?

Once he undertook to conquer all of Gaul, he was forced from

campaign 1£ another and probably found his work harder than he
had expected. 48 But did he ever try to prove that he was forced

~

to conquer Gaul !n !h! first place?
Gauls' right to their freedom.

He never attempts to deny the

Rather he coldly narrates his own

suppression of the continued rebellions of a struggling race.

Re-

call the past history of Gallo-Roman relations and you will see
why he needed to do no more to win over a Roman.
The consideration of these four typical charges of unreliability in the Commentaries of Caesar have sufficed, we think, to
show us the general nature of particular accusations.

Let us now

restate what we said before is the simpler and more convincing
argument, namely, that it was neither necessary nor expedi'ht for

47 Cf. pp. 22-23, above.
48 Holmes, 227.

,
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Caesar to lle ln order to prove the legallty of hls actlons.
was

~

It

necessary to lle because after the conference at Lucca hls

command ln Gaul had been prolonged for flve years, even though he
had been carrylng on formally

unconstl~tlonal

wars slnce 58.

Se-

condly, the Senate had already decreed unprecedented thanksglvlngs 49 for hls vlctorles over the Belgae and the marltlme states. 50

'.

Thlrdly, Clcero had glven support to a measure ln the Senate (In
56) whlch would provlde pay for Caesar's troops (troops ralsed on
hls own authorlty), and had besldes "pronounced a glowing panegyric
on his explolts ln Gaul."5l

Lastly, we may ask wlth Holmes,

I

were

not lllegal and unconstltutlonal acts frequent in those revolutionary tlmes?u52

The Constltutlon was dead.

Caesar knew that; he was

looking ahead and could not be too concerned wlth the fact.

...

Nor does it seem expedlent for Caesar to have dlstorted the
truth.

His lleutenants could easlly have refuted such evldent

falsehoods as those with whlch he ls charged.

Or ls lt to be

,
49 B.G ... II, 35, HOb easQue res ex lltterls Caesarls ln dles
quTnaeclm suppllcatl0 decreta est, quod ante ld tempus accedlt
nulll." "
50 Success was justlflcatlon enough for the Senate provlded the
general dld not show too many slgns of becomlng one of !ts own
opponents - as Caesar of course was dolng. But lf the Senators
wanted to oust hlm, they would have to do so on other grounds
than the legallty of hls wars.
51 How, 153. Thls was the speech, ~ Provlnciis Consularlbus.
52 Holmes, 220.

48
supposed that everyone in the army was in on the secret?
would be a rather remarkable sign of unity in days

~hen

That
even trium-

virs watched one another's actions more closely than those of public enemies.
Legal justification of his campaigns may not, however, have
been Caesar's purpose in writing the Cotmentaries.

Perhaps, to use

a clever distinction of Holmes, this work was not an apology but an
apo1ogia. 53 With a conquered nation behind him and a civil war ahead of him, "the next step in the argument is to conclude that
Caesar did write an account of his conquest of Gaul to reassure his
friends and to warn his enemies ••• "54

This ls, we think, a most

probable motlve for the composition of the Gallic Wars.

Rostovt-

zeff speaks of the Greek historians of the time who were singing
the praises ot Pompey.55

Caesar was not going to run the risk of
~

having others ignore his services to the state.

Therefore, the

ambitious general "himself undertook to explain to the Roman people
the significance of his task in Gau1."56

Now if it is true that

this,. and not legal justification, was his main aim in writing,
we may ask ourselves which of the norms laid down by Cicero would
e.

53 Ibid., 229.
54 newItt, 341. (This is not, however, DeWitt's personal opinion.)
55 Rostovtzeff, 137.
56 Ibid., 148.

,
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Caesar be more likely to violate.

It seems that were he to resort

to misrepresentation it would be to ignore the last two recommendations of the orator: Ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo. Ne
or not Caesar made his
QUae simultatis. 57 Let us see then w~~ther
...,.. ...,
work so much of an apologia as to be guilty of partiality or
animosity.

.
Now it is evident that if this discussion is to have any sense

whatever, we must understand what is meant by the word partial.
For we are, after all, dealing with an autobiography and unless we
are content to have Caesar playing a prominent part in his own accounts, even as he did in real life, we are apt to be prejudiced
from the start.

It must be remembered that not everyone speaking

in his own defense has to be partial.

Some men do not have to

sacrifice truth to gain the end they desire.

The only point for us
A

to decide in this part of the thesis, then, is whether or not Caesar magnified his own successes beyond their importance.
Most of the arguments against Caesar's credibility on this
score deal with exaggerations of the number of his enemies.

,

Rice

Holmes considers eight of these charges which impute lies to Caesal

..

57

~

Oratore, II, 62.

50
out of motives of vanity.58

In aL~ost all of these instances the

critics are scholars59 who come loaded dovrn with subtle arguments
from internal arl external evidence to prove the military and
geographical impossibility of Caesar 'railmi ttedly one of the greatest strategists of all time) ever having such a large enemy to contend with as he claims. 60

Now although.each of these arglJ.l'l'Ents

is refuted point for point by Holmes, it is again doubtful whether
his most telling argument - because so simple and obvious - is not
the fact that there were certainly many personal enemies of Caesar
who would be able and anxious to refute the general's testimony, if
it were so obviously exaggerated.

Labienus, for instance, went

over to Pompey but there is no record of him stating that Caesar's
records of his ovm accomplishments were false.

As a matter of

fact, if we except the remarks of Suetonius on the criticism of'"
Asinius Pollio,6l (a criticism which, as it stands, is rather

58 Holmes, 229-49.
59 Napoleon (the general) is a critic of Caesar's truthfulness in
one case. He is, it is true, an adversary of weight but the
answer of" Holmes (243) seems to be cogent.
60 Some of the critics are: Rauchenstein, M. de la Borderie~' Ihne,
Eicheim.
61 Divus Julius, LVI. If Pollio ASinius, parum diligenter, parumque
integra veritate compositos, putat, cum Caesar pleraque ••••
temere crediderit, et ••• perperam ediderit: existimatque, rescripturum et correcturum fuisse.

,
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vague) the Commentaries were considered accurate by the ancients. 62
There is another simple. argument which because of its practicality is very likely to escape the

~v~r-zealous

test-examiner.

Who can doubt that the conquest of Gaul, told without any embellis
ments, but simply and vividly, just as it happened, was in itself
an achievement sufficient to secure for.Caesar the fame and the
sympathy that he desired?

Consider the following passage from

Duruy:

But one day news came that he had defeated four
hundred thousand Helvetii and a hundred and
twenty thousand Suevi, and then the Belgae and
Armoricansj another time that he had crossed the
Rhine, and that he had carried the Roman eagles
into Britain, the very western extremity of the
world. And letters of officers and soldiers
described those terrible struggles in the midst
of wild countries ••• 6 3
Now ask yourself why he should tell lies that could easily be

~

futed when the Romans for the last seven years had been hearing of
the conquest of the Gauls, the Germans, ultimigue Brittani?

Does

General Eisenhower have to stretch the facts to win praise for hi'
own achievements?

Would a prudent man dare to do so?

Such

62 Ibid., -De iisdem commentariie Hirtius ita praedicat: 'Ideo
probantur omnium judicio, ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas
ecriptoribus videatur.'
63 Duruy, History of Rome, ed. by J.P.Mahaffy, transl. by M.Rip1ey
and W. Clarke, ~F. Jewett, Boston, 1883, III, 359.

52
extrlnslc arguments from clrcumstances show that the Commentarles
are worthy of the trust they have commonly recelveg.
But besldes belng falr to the

let~er

ln speaklng of hls own

deeds, lt ls posslble that Caesar has slnned agalnst the splrlt of
thls vlrtue by falllng to mentlon the actlons of hls helpers ln th
great

c~mpalgns.

Such, however, does n,t seem to be the case.

exploits of Lab1enus, for example, are frequently mentloned.6~
Perhaps they are coldly narrated but thls coldness 1s a characterist1c of his style wh1ch applles even to the account of h1s own
accompllshaents. 65

Brutus' d1rectlon of the naval battle agalnst
the Venetl is fully descrlbed and at least lmpllcltly pralaed. 66

He often speaks hlghly of the conduct of hls own men ln battle,67
even though we are perhaps too often reminded that they would dle
gladly provlded Caesar was looking on. 68 Agaln, speclf1c lnst~ce
of valor 69 are slngled out to show what the general could rely on

,
64 B.~., V, 8, 57-58; VI, 7-8; VII, 62, 87.
65 THls coldness ls marked, arls1ng from hls obJectlve treatment,
1.e., his allowlng facts to tell thelr own story wlthout comment." Bond and Walpole, xxxiv.
66 B.G., III, 7-16.
67 ibld., V, 8. "Qua ln re admodum fult mllltum virtus lau~anda,
qui vectorl1s gravlbusque navlgi1s non intermlsso remlgandl
labore longarum navlun cursum adaequarunt."
68 Thls 1s true, however. As was stated above (p.22), loyalty to
one commander was the new slgnlflcance of the Roman army.
69 Cf. the story of Baculus, VI, 38. • ••• vldet, lmmlnere hostes
atque ln summo esse rem dlscrimine: caplt arma a proxlmls atque
ln porta conslstit;" also, the words of the famous standardbearer on the Brltlsh coast l IV, 25, "Desll1te ••• mllltea, nlsl
vultla aqulla. hostlbus proaere:
ego certe meum rel publlcae
atque lmperatorl offlclum praestltero."

.'

for his success.
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The famous holdout of Quintus Cicero against the
Nervii is not forgotten. 70 Perhaps this is all a rhetorical trick

to gain sympathy, but the world could use more of this kind of
rhetoric.

At least Caesar was not s09preoccupied with himself that

he failed to realize the desire of most readers to hear a little
about someone other than the great commander •

•
How honest is he in recounting his own failures?

it might be asked, "Did he make mistakes?"

First of al

As a matter of fact

objective history proves that he did not make too many of them except to pardon his own enemies at Rome.

Suetonius concludes his

account of the Gallic campaign with the following:
••• per tot successus ter, nec amplius, adversum
casum expertus; 1n Britannia, classe v1 tempestat1s prope absumpta; et in Gal11a, ad Gergoviam legione fusa; et 1n Germanorumfin1bus, TitU=l
rio et Aurunceleio legat1s per 1ne1dias caeeie. 7
Now although 1t 1s true that he blames this last defeat (which his
troops experienced in h1s absence)72 on the foolhardiness of a
general,73 the words with which he announces h1s withdrawal from,

70 B.Q. V, 52, "Ciceronem pro eJus merito legionemque collaudat;
centur10nes singillatim tr1bunosque.militum appellat, quorum
egregiam fu1ss. virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat'."
71 D1vus Ju11us, XXV.
72 B.G., V. 27-38.
73 ibid., 52. "Quod detr1mentum culpa et temeritate legati sit
acceptum ••• II
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Gergovia, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque
animos confirmandos existimans are a weak disguise
that he had been beaten.74

of

the fact

If he were ~ctually interested in cover

ing up his failure, it would be a poor performance for one who was
considered one of the finest orators at Rome.
could have served him to better advantag..

Surely his rhetoric

But an example of the

lengths to which some of his critics will go to accuse him of rhetorical intentions, is the interpretation they put on his digression on the life and customs of the Gauls and the Germans.75
"Some critics - Germans, it need hardly be said - have insisted
that the digression was inserted here simply to cover his retreat
from the eyes of the Roman public: I invaded and I retreated these must not stand too close to each other."76

But, granting
".

that he did not dilate on his failure, is it not fair to say "it

was inevitable that some things should be suppressed which would
give a handle to his enemies at home."77

Provided he did not

exaggerate his victories as Sulla did,7 8 it is unnecessary to

74
75
76
77
78

.'

Ibid., VII, 53.
Ibid., VI, 11.28.
Fowler, 216.
Ibid., 132.
~(Sulla) would, for example, have his readers believe that
at the battle of Sacriportus he lost but 23 men and the enemy
20,000 killed and 8,000 prisoners." Ross, 206.

,

--
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demand that he write Confessions. 79
Cicero's last norm for credibility in history is that the
historian avoid animosity.

How does, Caesar observe this norm?
.~~

If

the Commentaries were published after Labienus went over to the
camp of Pompey, that general certainly got more praise than he
might have eXpected from a less gallan~foe.80

On the other hand,

if the work was written in view of the Civil War, that fact did

no~

prevent the author from speaking favorably of Pompey whenever he
mentions him.

Thus, when Caesar asked recruits from Cisalpine

Gaul, Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset. 8l

Regard-

ing the troubles at Rome in 52, Caesar remarks iam ille urbanas rea
virtute Gnei Pompei commodiorem in .tatum Bervenisae intellegeret~~
Though praised highly for his defense against the Nervii, Quintus
Cicero is not given a proportionate condemnation for his rashness
at Aduatuca. 83 And if we may use the negative argument, there are
no digressions to attack his political enemies.

In fact, hardly

any mention is mad.e of the conditions at Rome except to tell who,

79 "His enemies were annoyed at his victories, made capital out

80
81
82
83

of his defeats, and spread false news ••• " Bond and Wa190le,
XXXii, note 5.
Cf. note 64.
B7G., VI, 1.
Ibid., VII, 6.
Ibid., VI, 36 " ••• simul eorum per motus vocibus, qui illius
patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant ..• nullam ejusmodi
casum expectans ••• "
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the consuls were in each year of the campaign.

Caesar was writing

a history of the Gallic War, no matter what his motive was in doing
so.
~~

We are now ready to summarize the discussion of this part of
the thesis - the conformity of the Commentaries to our first division of Ciceronian norms.

What, we ask. should be the reasonable

opinion of the credibility of Caesar's narrative?

That a man is

innocent until proven guilty is one of our most valued principles.
Therefore, in the absence of cogent testimony to the contrary; in
the light of reliable (though not absolute) ,testimony to credibili
ty, we announce as our verdict:
campaigns against

Although Caesar's accounts of his

the Gallic and Germanic tribes were written wit

'subjective interest, they are also an objectively accurate summary
of an event which held a great significance in the fortunes of
~

Caesar, in the growing Empire of Rome, and in the civilization of
the West.
It follows, too, that if the Gallic!!£! are credible histo-'
ry, they display a characteristic absent in so much of Roman his-

..

torical compositions up to the period of Caesar and Cicero.

In

most of the previous work the historians' reliability was vitiated
by an oratorical purpose.

But Caesar did not allow the personal

motive to give to his work a rhetorical!2n!.

Perhaps the ulti-

mate answer to this apparent contradiction may be found in Fowler'

.'
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description of Caesar's character:
His turn of mind, as has already been pointed
out was not rhetorical but scientific; it was
not words or ideals that attracted him, but
facts and knowledge. In otAs.. words, he did
not follow the pseudo-Hellenic culture of the
day but asserted the truly Roman character .••
This is visible in his writings which have
come down to us, which are the exuression in
the fewest possible words of ~litary, geographical, and ethnological observations •••
And ••• it may be traced in the whole of his
political work; not only in his steady refusal to deal with ideals and fancies ••• but
in the actual application of scient~fic knowledge to matters of public concern. 54
Vifhether or not Caesar would stoop to distorting the truth is
not, however, the question of this thesis.

It is quite possible

that in the composition of the Civil Wars when the political and
constitutional issues were so involved,85 Caesar might have had
to use falsehood to secure his end.
concern us now.

not~

Fortunately, that does

For the problem of this chapter was not, IIIs

Caesar a credible historian?" but !tAre the Gallic Wars credible
history? II

..

Having proved the credibility of Caesar's Commentaries, let
us proceed to see whether he has provided us with a literary

8t~

Fowler, 358
85 How, Appendix 5, liThe Legal Question at Issue between Caesar
and the Senate," 312-317.

,
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history as well, by conforming to those norms

or

Cicero for his-

torical writing which deal with presentation and style.

,

..

CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORICAL ARTISTRY OF THE GALLIC WARS
Although so llttle of Roman hlst.~1cal llterature was really
reliable, the recommendatlons of Clcero for attalnlng truth in this
fleld are comparatlvely brlef.

For he was hlmself more concerned

•

wlth an artistlc deflclency whlch, we mlght say, doomed the hlstorlan's work to a llterary mortallty from the very outset. l

It may

be that he dld not recognlze the sclentlflc weakness of prevlous
Roman hlstory.

But at any rate he dld realize that reliabllity was

the first requlrement for good hlstory.
the preceedlng chapter that the

Gal11~

We have trled to show ln
Wars meets hls demands ln

this regard, elementary as they may be.
It ls, then, on this foundatlon that Clcero proceeds "to

~

build a theory of sclent1fic crit1clsm that would do credlt to any
modern Unlversity professor. u2 Such an estimate ls, of course,
,

exaggerated lf the meanlng ls that we have here a completely expressed theory of hlstory.

I

But the statement may certa1nly be

1 uThese general chronlcles, treatises for scholastlc 1nstruction
or manuals for reference, and the whole literature therewlth connected whlch subsequently became very copious ln the Latln language also, can hardly be reckoned as be10nglng to artistlc hlstorlcal composltlon." Mommsen, IV, 604.
2 Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., Roman Education from Clcero to Qu1nti1ian,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926, 106.
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accepted lf lt means that there ls contalned in this passage from
the De Oratore, ln germ at least, a declaration of the simple requirements of historlcal craftsmanshlp.

Although no one wlll deny

that there have been untold advances fn ;nlstorical methodology
4

since the days of the anclents, we must remember that it is the methodology and not so much the ldeal tha\haS been perfected.

That

Clcero's ldeal, for example, was a high one is shown by the following passage in whlch his recommendations are summed up by Aubrey
Gwynn, who uses modern expressions to denote the same suggestlons
that the Roman critic made so many centuries ago.
An accurate knowledge of chronology and geography, due attentlon to the causes which underlie
superficlal phenomena, the laws of human psychology, the standards of publlc morality and
the moral influences of great personalities: all
these Cicero requires, and his concluding precept ls a warnlng agalnst too much attentlon to
llterary ornament. 3
If it is asked why Clcero's artistic norms are more developed
than those whlch deal with the scientlfic aspect of the historian's
task, the probable answer is that the anclents regarded hlstory as,
belng prlmarily a work of art.'

Although we have seen the dangers

lnvolved in too close an adherence to thls vlew, lt cannot be de-

.'

nled that the too scientlflc approach can be equally unfortunate.

3 Gwynn, 106.
, De Oratore, II, 62;
X, 1, 31.

~

Legibus I, 5; Qulntlllan,

1n!!. Orate
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.'

"Occasionally historlans have trled to avold the contamlnation of
art by sheer dullness
terary."5
result.

l~

their effort'to avold

beln~

popular or li-

As a llterary critlc Clcero was anxious to avoid such a

As sketched by hlm the rules',Jar artlstic composition may

be divlded into those treating of historical presentation and
historical style.

,.

In dealing with historical presentatlon l Clcero emphasizes two
qualities I clarity and what may be called "historical perspective l

"

the latter a gift possessed by very few of Caesar's predecessors.
Before proceeding to determine to what extent the work of Caesar
exemplifies these pOints, a reminder is necessary.

In his own

opinlon Caesar was not composing a finlshed history but rather
commentarli rerum gestarum for the sake of future historians. 6 A
short explanation of the distlnction between the two will show why
,..
we must keep this fact in mind when applying the Ciceronian norms
to the Gallic Wars.

For these norms are very briefly stated and

will consequently demand modification to suit the partlcular type
of history under discussion.

5 Godolphin.l. xv.
6 Hirtius, ~.Q., VIII, proem.

..

,

.'
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Originally commentarii had the technical meaning of being
notes or memoranda which were given to

an

historian as material on

which he could base his more complete work.'
,

.
9

Thus Cicero offered

commentarii to Lucceius for writing a hietory of his famous consulship.

But in addltlon to thls purely prelimlnary function, the

.

Commentaril were becom1ng 1n Caesarts time a dlstinct literary
genre. 8 They were not intended to secure a large circulation and
(except 1n the case of Caesar) they were not wrltten with too great
an attempt at literary stYle. 9 Thls new kind of history formed a
sort of mean between the anna11stic method of the Romans whlch slm
ply grouped all events accordlng to strict chronolog1cal sequence,
and the more d1fficult but lntel11gent method whlch grouped events
according to their causal connections.

Commentarli were similar

to the annals ln this respect that they set down the events of
every year separately.

,..

But they were not exactly the same because

"in Caesart s youth ••• the d1stlnctlon was already made that ln the
composition of res gestae it was not enough to tell what was done,
sed etiam quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent." 10

,

, Francls W. Kelsey, MThe T1tle of Caesar's Work on the Gallic and
Civil Wars.· TAPA, XXXVI, (1905), 225. ,
.,
8 By way of confirmlng his thesls that Caesar wrote h1s work purely for the sake of poster1ty, Norman DeW1tt polnts out the similarlty between the l1terary type he chose and the Ephemer1des or
H7pomnemata of Ptolemy wh1ch recorded the conquests of Alexander,
"both of whlch terms were to be translated by the Lat1n
commentar1i,· 345.
9 Cf. DeW1tt, 346, and Kelsey, 226.
10 Kelsey,. 233.
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From this distinction between complete history and commentari
it follows that we must not attempt to make Caesar's work exemplify
the requirements of Cicero to a greater extent than the latter himself would demand.

For in drawing Up'ft~ norms it seems that he

had in view a history which would cover a large span of years.

As

a matter of fact he implies in the De Legibus that he was contemplating writing such a history himself.

lt

This does not mean, how-

ever, that we cannot use the norms expressed in the De Oratore as
a basis for examining the artistry of the

Gallic~.

For though

a universal history or a history of Rome !£ urbe condita would
give a writer a fuller scope for putting into practice the Ciceronian advice,l2 even the writer of Commentaries should be able
to profit by applying the same rules within the limitations of
this new literary genre.

We will then have an opportunity to see

that Caesar appreciated the value of Cicero's canons.

It was it\'

fact because he did appreciate them that he "probably without

11 De Legibus, I, 8.
12 Hid Caesar devoted himself to writing a universal history, he
would probably have been most capable of exercising historical
perspective - at least if we may judge by his ability to note
trends in Roman politics and foresee the doom of the Constitution.
•.

,
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.'

realizing it himself, produced a literary masterpiece of the first
rank. 1113
It will be helpful before we proceed to the detailed proof of
this last statement to repeat the co~r&te passage in the De Orato~

which deals with the rules for an effective presentation:
••• ipsa autem exaedificat10 PQs1ta est in rebus
et verb1s: rerum rat10 ord1nel temporum des1derat, regionum descr1pt10nem; volt et1am, quon1am
1n rebus magn1s memor1aque d1gn1s cons1l1a pr1mum, de1nde acta, postea eventus exspectantur,
et de cons11i1s s1gnif1cari quid scr1ptor probet et in rebus gest1s declarar1 non solum qu1d
actum aut d1ctum s1t, sed et1am quo modo, et cum
eventu d1catur, ut causae exp11cantur omnes vel
casus vel sap1ent1ae vel temer1tat1s;hom1numque
1psorum non solum res gestae, sed et1am, qu1 fama et nomlie excel1ant, de cuJulque v1ta atque
natura •••
In stat1ng h1s f1rst rule, rerum rat10 ord1nem temporum del1-

derat, reg10num descr1pt10nem C1cero 1s emphas1z1ng, we th1nk,
~

that quality wh1ch 1s of the greatest necess1ty 1n any kind of wr1t1ng.

C1ar1ty manifests 1tself 1n various ways in the var10us

k1nds of l1terature.

Thus in a speech 1t would be probably most

,

exerc1sed 1n the transit10n from one argument to another, or 1n
the prec1se"statement of one's own case as opposed to that of the

..

13 Kelsey, 219. So, although the words of W1ght Duff, lithe annal1st1c ~ethod wh1ch culm1nated in Caesar" are true 1n the1r context, \p. 417) they are apt to be a little mislead1ng. Even
were we to presc1nd trom the style ot the GalliC Wars (of wh1ch
more later), the work is far super10r to anything the anna11sts
ever produced.·
14 De Oratore, II, 16.

.'
adversary; in drama, in the steady development
plot or delineation

o~

an intricate

character; in a treatise on rhetoric,

example, in the orderly division
in their appointed order.
long past or in regions

o~
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the topics to be treated, all

o~

.9 ....,

In history which

un~amiliar

~or

o~ten

treats

o~

events

to the reader, it would come

most into play in presenting a clear c~onological and topological
picture o~ the events to be narrated. 15
is demfuided

o~

More than this o~ course

the historian but this, at least, is essential. For

Crassus t words resarding the necessity
may be applied to the composition

o~

o~

clearness is the speech

history as well.

"We cannot

hope that he who cannot make us understand what he says, will make
us adrnire what he says."16
a sine qua

~

But despite the ~act that clarity is

in writing, there may be various grades

lence in obtaining this essential objective.

o~

excel,..

Let us see then how

Caesar has succeeded in presenting the ordinem temporum and regionum descriptionem in a typical instance - the expedition against ,
the Helvetians which is related in the First Commentary.17

.'

15 This is not the only application o~ clarity in history, but it
is, we thiru{, the chie~ one.
16 De Oratore, III, 38. "Neque sperare possumus eum qui non dicat
quod intelligamus hunc posse quod admiremur dicere."
17 In the ~ollowing paragraphs the italicized expressions represent temporal re~erences ~ound in Caesar's text.

.'
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At the beginning of the book the narrow boundaries of Helvetia
are accurately described,18 and we are told that th~ Gauls f1rst
conceived the idea of emigratlng from them when Messalla and Marcus
~ consuls. 19 They thought that twe'~ears would be sufficlent
for the preparat10ns,20 and declded on the route through the Roman
province because the Rhone was easily fordable there,2l whereas the
route which ran between the Jura range ind the river could easily
be blocked against them. 22 Accordingly, 1n !h! consulship of Lucius Piso and Gabinius they' were ready to move and agreed to meet
at the banks of the Rhone on March 28. 23 Hearing of the movement,
Caesar hastened to the mustering place and delayed his answer to
the Helvetian request for free passage through the Roman territory.24

He spent the intervening time by destroy1ng the brldge at

Geneva,25 and by building an entrenchment from the Lake ot Geneva
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

~.Q.,

I, 2. " ••• undlque locl natura Helvetll continentur: una el
parte flumlne Rheno altlsslmo, qul Agrum Helvetlum a Germanls
dlvldlt, tertla lacu Lemmano et flumlne Rhedano, qul est lnter
Sequanos et Helvetlos, altera ex parte monte Iura altlsslmo,
qul provlnclam nostram ab Helvetlls dlvldlt."
Ib1d., " .•• M. Messalla et M. Plsone consullbus."
Ibid., 3, "Ad eas res conficiendas biennlum satls esse duxerunt ••• "
Ibid., 6; " ••• lnter fines Helvetlorum et Allobrogum ••• Rhodanus
flult lsque nonnullis locls vado transltur."
Ibid., " ••• mons autem altlssimus impendebat, ut facile perpaucl
prohlbere iossent."
Ibid., 6, Is dies erat a.d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio
consulibus."
Ibid., 7, " ••• legatis respondit, dlem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: sl quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur."
~., "Pontem, qui erat ad Genevam, iubet resclndl."

,
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.'

to the Jura mountains. 26

On April 13 he finally refused the request to pass through the province. 27 After a vain attempt to
force the passage ot the Rhone, the Helvetians withdrew and decide
to go out of thelr territorr by the ~\ernate route - through the
land ot the Sequani. 28 Caesar hurried back to Italy, enrolled two
legions and began his march back over the Alps to pursue the Helve
tian host.

In the land of the Ceutrone' hls path was blocked by

the Gallic tribes, but only for a short time.

For defeating them,

he arrived ~ ~ seventh day in the land ot the Vocontii ln Further Gaul.

From that point he easl1y proceeded to the country of
the Segusiavi, the first tribe across the Rhone. 29 !l lh1! !!!!
the Helvetians had reached the land of the Aedui. 30 At the latter's request Caesar deeided to attack the invaders.

~

three-

fourths of the Helvetians had crossed the Saone, wh1ch separates
the territorJ of the Aedui from that of the Seguani,31
26

Caesar~am

~.,

8. I ••• a lacu Lemanoo, qui in flumen Rhodanum 1nfluit,
ad montem Juram ••• mi11a passuum decem novern murum ••• fossamque
perducit. 1t
27 (P.44) Ibid., IUb1 ea dles, quam constiterat ven1t .•• negat se.(
iter ••• dare.
28 ~., 9, "Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via." Th1s had previously been described as "angus tum et d1ff1cile, inter montem
Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur ••• "
Ibid. I 5.

..

29 Ibld., 10, • ••• in f1nes Vocont1orum ulter1or1s provinclae die
sept1mo pervenit; 1nde in Allobrogum f1nes, ab Allobroglbu8 ln
Seguslavos exercitum ducit. Hl sunt extra provinc1am trans
Rhodanum prlml."
30 ~., 11, "Helvet1l lam ••• ln Aeduorum fines pervenerant.'
31 Ibid., 12~.·Flumen est Arar, ~uod ~er flnes Aeduorum et Sequanorum 1n nnodanum lnflult ••• UD1 ••• 0aesar certlor factus est,
tres Jam partes ••• 1d flumen traduxlsse ••• de tertla v1g111a cum
legionibus tribus e castr1s profectus ad eam partem perven1t
dum f um n tran 1erat."
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upon the remalnlng quarter

In

the thlrd watch

Transferrlng hls army over the Saone ln

an~

routed It.

day - ,n operatlon
whlch had taken the enemy twenty days to complete 32 he scared the
Helvetlans lnto sendlng deput1es.

~

The~,refused

the Romans' terms

however and moved thelr camp Qn ~ followlng day.33
sued ~ about a fortnlght. 34

Caesar pur-

Meanwhl1e Caesar was trying to get the corn promlsed by the
Aedul because lt was only early sprlng~O

After learnlng that Dum-

norlx, the Aeduan, was causlng the delay and had also been the
cause of Caesar's cavalry retreatlng ! few days before,36 he secured hlmse1f agalnst further trouble from that source.

On the

!!!! day the enemy came up close to the Roman camp,37 and Caesar

told Lablenus to selze a helght overlooklng, the enemy.
lett at

lh!

The latter

thlrd watch and Caesar hlmself advanced in the fourAh

32 Ibld., 13, " ••• cum ld, quod lpsl dlebus xx aegerrlme confecerant, ut f1umen translrent, 111um uno dle teclsse lntel1egeren~
legatos ad eum mlttunt."
,
33 Ibld., 10, 'Postero dle castra ex eo loco movent •.• "
34 Ibld., "Ita dles clrclter qulndeclm lter tecerunt ••• •
35 Ibld., 16, Interlm cotldle Caesar Aeduos frumentum ••• flag1tare.
Nam propter frlgora, quod Gallla sub septentrlonlbus, ut ante
dlctum est, poslta est, non modo frumenta ln agrls matu~a non
erant, sed ne pabu11 quldem satls magna copla suppetebat ••• •
36 I2!S., 18, ·Reperlebat etlam ••• quod proe11um equestre adversum
paucis ante dlebus esset factum ••• "
37 Ibld., 21, ·Eodem dle •.• certlor factus, hostes sub monte consedlsse ml1la passuum ab lpslus castrls octo ••• •

watch. 38

.'
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At ~ Lablenus had taken the helght and Caesar had

come up to w1th1n a mlle of the enemy.39 But afte~ hls plan had
fa11ed because of a blunder of one of h1s trusted 11eutenants, the
Helvetlans shlfted camp ~ the day ~ ~ spent. 40 Caesar
followed £n the ~ dal4l and pltched hls own camp three ml1es
d1stant. On !a! morrow42 he ceased h1s pursu1t and turned towards

.-

Blbracte, wh1ch was elghteen m11es away because he had only two
days corn supply.
to attack hlm.

Th1nking the retreat a detour, the enemy turned

In a flerce battle that lasted !£2m !n! seventh

~ to eventlde, the Romans were vlctorious,43

The surviv1ng

Helvet1ans marched all through the n1ght and cont1nuously for the
~ three days,44 tlll they reached the land of the Llngones.

After ~ three dayS' 1nterval Caesar started agaln ln pursu1t. 45
The Helvet1ans could stand no more.

The1r envoys came w1th terms

of surrender and the threat to Rome was a thlng of the past.
38 Ibld., 'De tert1a vlgl11a Tltum Lablenum ••• summum lugum montls
ascendere lubet ••• Ipse de quarta v1g1l1a .•• ad eos contendlt ••• •
£9 ~., 22, 'Prlma luce, cum summus mons a Lableno teneretur,
lpse ab hostlum castrls non longlus mll1e et qu1ngentls passlbus abesset ••• 1
40 Ibld., 'Multo denlque d1e ••• Caesar cognovlt ••• Helvetlos castra
movlsse ••-. It
41 Ibld., lEo dle, quo eonsuerat lntervallo, hostes sequltqr ••• 1
42 ~., 23, "Postrldle e~us diel ••• lter ab Helvetlls avertlt ac
Blbracte lre eontend1t.
43 ~., 26, 'Nam hoc toto proe110, cum ab hora septlma ad vesperum pugnatum slt ••• 1
44 Ib1d., lEx eo proell0 elrclter mllla homlnum cxxx superfuerunt
eaque tota noete contlnenter lerunt: nullam partem noctls lt1nere 1ntermlsso 1n f1nes Llngonum dle quarto pervenerunt, cum
et propter vulnera mll1tum et propter sepulturam occlsorum
nostr1 trlduum moratl eos sequl non potu1ssent. 1
45 Ibld. 26,"Ipse trlduo 1ntermlsso cum omnlbus coplls eos sequl."

.'
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In the preceedlng paragraphs we have emphaslzed the temporal
references found ln the report of the Helvetlan Campalgn, and have
clted only those geographlcal references whlch would make the shor
summary lntelllglble and at the same .time sufflce to exempllfy the

••

clarlty of Caesar's narratlve ln thls regard.

But hls own des-

crlptlons of the country are fuller and more frequent, although
they may stlll be consldered brlef

and~ven

cryptlc.

Besldes the

famous Gallla est omnls dlvlsa ln partes tree and the general descrlptlon of Gaul whlch !ollows,46 there are other numerous descrlptlons of partlcular reglons, e.g. of Helvetla47 and the varlou
camp sltes 48 whlch must be clearly plctured by the reader who deslres an lntelllgent understandlng of the battles.

References to
the Rhlne glve us an lmpresslon of lts psychologlca1 49 and geo-

graphlca1 50 lmportance as a barrler between two great races.

46 Ibld., I, 1.
47 Cf., n. 18 above.
48 ~G., I, 38, "Namque omnlum rerum, quae ad bellum usul erant,
summa erat ln eo oppldo facultas, ldque natura locl slc munlebatur, ut magnum ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen Dubls ut clrclno clrcumductum paene totum oppldum cinglt; rellquum spatlum, quod est non ampllus pedum mllle sexce~torum, qua flumen lntermlttlt, mons contlnet magna
altltudlne, lta, ut radices montls ex utraque parte rlpae
flumlnls contlngant. Hunc murus clrcumdatus arcem effl~lt
et cum oppldo conjunglt. N Cf. also, II, 5, 8, 29; III, 1.
49 Ibld., IV, 16, " ••• cum vlderet Germanos tam faclle impelli,
ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere volult,
cum intellegerent et posse et audere popull Romanl exercltum
Rhenum transire."
50 Ibid., NPopuli Romani imperlum Rhenum flnire: si se lnvlto
Germanos in Galllam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sul
qulcquam esse imperil aut potestatls trans Rhenum postularet?"
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There are good descr1pt10ns of the land of Br1ta1n51 (1nclud1ng
one of the wh1te c11ffs of Dover)52 wh1ch are acc~ate enough,
cons1der1ng the 11m1tat10ns of anc1ent geography.53

As a matter

of fact, w1th a reasonably good map to'#1d the eye, the Gal11c
~

compr1ses one of the eas1est h1gh-sohool texts to follow.

Caesar has all but thrust a teach1ng dev1ce 1nto the 1nstructor's hand.

We th1nk, then, that C1cer~ would adm1t that the

recommendat10n he g1ves 1n the Orator when speak1ng of h1story,
1n qua ••• reg10 saepe aut pugna descr1b1tur,54 was more than suff1c1ently exemp11f1ed 1n Caesar's work.
We may perhaps best sum up our remarks on the .bronolog1cal
and topolog1cal clar1ty of the Gal11c Wars by rem1nd1ng the read
er that 1t 1s one of the most famous m1l1tary h1stor1es of all
t1me.

Th1s expla1ns 1ts pecu11ar attract10n for the Emperor

Napoleon, and the interest wh1ch was taken 1n 1t by the strateg1sts of all t1me and espec1ally dur1ng the fifteenth and

,
51
52
53
54

Ibid., V, 11, 12, 13.
Ibid., IV, 23.
H.J. Edwards, 606.
Orator, 66.
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sixteenth centuries. 55

Clearly it would never have gained such

a reputation had not its author payed very close attention to
details of terrain and to the order of time.

For the world's

.9 ...

fate has often been decided by the action of a moment.

Being a

soldier, it is precisely in his battle descriptions that Caesar
shows such a marked superiority to the .est of Roman historians successors as well as predecessors.

Livy becomes strangely obs-

cure in too many of his military accounts, because he had only
the scholar'S acquaintance with them.

Duff says that his "batt1e-

pieces are those of an artist, not of a soldier.
rather than instruct."56

They entertain

We think that to Livy rather than to

Caesar, apply the following words of Ferrero:
.•. he gives minute and coloured descriptions
of battles and sieges, to please the peaceful
burgher in Italy, who enjoyed, as men in a
peaceful and settled society always will enjoy, letting his imagination roam at leisure
over scenes of fighting and adventure, as he
turned the pages lazily over in the comfortable seclusion of his frescoed veranda.57

Here at least is a clear instance in which we may judge of Ferrero's ability to appraise the work of Caesar, and our estimate
•

55 DeWitt, IICornrnentarii de Cornrnentariis Caesaris,1I Classical
Bulletin, XVIII, (1941), 9.
56 Duff, 657.
57 Ferrero, II, 162.

is not too favorable.
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For if we may make use of a variation on

the words of Duff, the almost universal opinion of Caesar as a
military historian would be as follows: "Caesar's battle-pieces
are those of an artist Y. well.!! of',J!.'..nS0ldier.

They entertain

and instruct."

In this respect Caesar is to Livy as Xenophon
was to Thucydides. 58 Both Xenophon and Caesar were experienced
soldiers who added to the ability of gr\sPing the significant
details of terrain and time during the heat of battle, an equally remarkable facility in setting forth these details vividly
and intelligently for the amateurs who would read their accounts.
It is this Caeserian characteristic - one that was his both as a
soldier and as an opponent of the over-rhetorical style in history - which distinguishes the Commentaries from the work of
either Dio Cassius or Appian, as the more reliable report of the
Gallic campaign.

The latter historians, through their

efforts~o

please, confused the accounts of their main source, though all
they had to do was copy its careful attention to topological and
temporal details which means so much in a military history.59

58 Godolphin, XXXii, "When Xenophon criticizes the tactics of
strategy 'of the commanders he is usually on solid ground;
when he describes manoeuvers, the lucidity and intelligibility
of his style is in pleasing contrast to the complex and often
obscure mode of expressions adopted by Thucydides."
59 For an estimate by a professional soldier of the military value of the Gallic Wars, ~. Oliver Spaulding, "The Ancient
Military Writers, "-crissical Journal, XXVIII, (1932-3)
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But the Gallic Wars owes its popularity to other merits than
clarity.

Roger Cram is more than correct when he says, "I submit

that military history and military science of antiquity are not

...

very exciting reading, especially for . the high-school students. u60
Were strategic accuracy the only, or even the chief, recommendation of the Commentaries, it would be hard to explain why by the
middle of the nineteenth century in Ame'ica "Caesar had joined
Cicero and Vergil to form the inescapable triumvirate ••• of secondary school study.u6l

As a matter of fact, writing a useful mi-

litary account was only incidental to Caesar's main purpose. 62
There is a more humane significanoe to the history of the Gallic
campaigns.

This, we think, is due to the conformity of the work

with the other Ciceronian norms of historical presentation those that deal with the designs and methods and results of the
actions described, and with the characters which play
parts in the drama.

prominent~

To these pOints we shall now turn our atten-

tion.

60 Roger Cram, "Caesar and the Present, II Classical Bulletin,
XI X, ( 1943), 25.

61 DeWitt, Commentarii, 9.
62 "Caesar, qualified to deal with Hannibal on equal terms,· gave
us involuntarily a valuable military work, whereas he himself'
looked upon it rather as historical and political."
Spaulding, 662.
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Although Cicero would probably not object to a historian
merely recording events of mlnor

signlflcanc~,

he conslders lt

his clear duty when dealing wlth signlficant happenlngs to take
the reader "behind the scenes" by sho.rag him the why and wherefore of that slgnificance. 63

The flrst step ln this dlrectlon

is to polnt out the designs or plans of the human lnstruments

•

who turned the course of events into thelr different channels.
As an example of Caesar's observance of this canon, let us take
the account of the campaign against Arlovistus. 64 For if the
author's purpose was to Justify his war from a legal standpoint,
here, if any place he would be interested ln depicting both his
own designs and those of his enemy.

Moreover, he attains his

end by a method that is particularly skillful - a speech of
Divitiacus, the Aeduan.

It was delivered before Caesar at the

Gallic convention which followed the defeat of the Helvetians,

~

and had for its purpose the securing of the conqueror's aid
against the German lnvader.

Whether or not the speech was ac-

tually delivered by the Gaul does not concern us now.

This de-

vice was a convention in anclent history-writing and dld not
necessarily entall falsehood.

63

~e

•

Oratore, II, 61. "Quonlam in rebus magnls memoriaque
dignls, consllla primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectantur ••• "
64 g.G. It 31-47.

f
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The speech begins with a brief description of the political
situation in Gaul - a two-party system which was the occasion of
Ariovistus I intervention to "help" the Sequani. 65 In the course
of the speech we have the suggestion 0' '~wo of the reasons for
Caesar I s decision to interfere on behalf of the Gauls.

Ther are

the danger of further German advances across the Rhine, 66 and the
threat of a general migration of all the·Gauls,67 similar to that
of the Helvetians which Caesar had just succeeded in halting.

By

the concluding sentence of the speech:
Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus
vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse, ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamqu~80mnem ab
Ariovlsti injuria posse defendere.
Caesar shows that this is no petty quarrel with a German prince
but a conflict upon whose outcome will depend the subjection of

65 Ibid., 31. "Locutus est pro his Divitiacus Aeduus: Galliae
totius factiones esse duas: harum alteriusprincipatum tenere Aeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere de potentatu
inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse, uti ab ~ver
nis Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur ••• '"
66 Ibid., "Futurum esse paucis annis, uti omnes ex Galliae finibus
pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent ••• "
67 Ibid., IINisi si quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit aweilii,
omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut
domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a ~erma
nis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accidat, experiantur,"
68 Ibid.
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all Gaul to the German or the Roman empire.

Now that the war

has taken on a fuller significance we are prepared when, a few
paragraphs later, Caesar explicitly enumerates his own reasons
for engaging Ariovistus.

The first is·xhat the Aedui are
·9

...

"friends" of the Roman people,69 according to an official senatorial decree.

Secondly, the frequent crossing of the Rhine by

the Germans was not a good omen for the~oman state. 70

Lastly,

Ariovistus had committed the unforgivable sin in the eyes of
the Romans - forgetting the dignity of their name. 71This, then,
was the meaning72 of the war with Ariovistus.
Similarly the plan of the emigrating Helvetians is clearly
stated - to show that the movement was no mere domestic concern
but an international problem.

Dumnorix, according to Caesar,

hoped to unite with the Aedui and the Seguani in securing the

69 Ibid., 33. MEt secundum ea multae res eum hortabuntur, quare
sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, 1mpr1mis,
quod Aeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepenumero a senatu
appellatos, in serv1tute atque in dic10ne videbat •.• tener1 •.•
70 Ibid., "Paulat1m autem Germanos coneueecere Rhenum trans1re,
et 1n Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire, populo Romano
periculosum videbat ..• u
71 Ib1d., "Ipse autem Ar10vietue tantos sibi spiritus, tantam
arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur."
•
72 Meaning, we think, 1s a Justifiable interpretation of the
word, consilia, in the text of Cicero. By learning the plans
of the persons engaged in the actions, we come to know the
s1gnif1cance of those actions.

,
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mastery of all Gaul.73

Nor was it only Rome's hopes to the

domination of Gaul that were threatened, but Her very security
was being weakened.

For Caesar had heard that the Helvetians

intended to march through the land o~ibe Sequani and Aedui into
that of the Santones, who were not far from Toulouse in the
Roman province.74
vVhat, finally, is the significance of the various rebellions
recounted in the course of the Commentaries?
which gives the reason for the Belgian

The statement

conspiracy~

ita populi Romani hiemare exercitum atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant ••• 7~
the suspicions of the Veragri and Seduni during the campaign of
the year

56

that:

Romanos non solum itineru:m causa, sed etiam
perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari
ea loca finitimae provinciae
adiungere •••

75

the hope of the maritime states:
in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint
permanere quam Roman 0 rum servitutem perferre. 77
•

73 B.G., I, 3. IIHac oratione adducti inter se fidem et iusiurandum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant. 1I
74 B. G., I, 10.

75 B.G.,
76

B~G.,

II, 1.

III, 2.

77 Ibid., 8.
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and numerous other instances make it clear that the Gallic contest is one between a people struggling for their freedom and a
powerful state which is greedy of empire.

....

If the reader fails

to get that impression while reading of the various battles and
journeys of Caesar's army, it is not the historian's fault.7 8
Cicero was definitely thinking of t~e annalistic method
which characterized so much of the Roman

history-v~iting

before

his time, when he stated the norm to be considered next.

The

annals were often little more than catalogues of deeds and
names, but to suit him, the historian must not tell only what
was said or done but ~ it was said or done.79
any better than his predecessors in this regard?

Now was Caesar
We have already

mentioned the importance of his work as a military text-book

78 The added recommendation of Cicero that the historian tell
what plans he approves and disapproves is one of those that
has to be modified according to the type of work under consideration. Since the Gallic Wars is autobiographical, there
is no need of Caesar telling what plans he approves. Naturally
he approves of his own and disapproves of those of his enemies.
But provided that the designs are stated, we have no complaint.
It is besides far from clear whether or not history profits
from this moralistic interpretation of which Cicero speaks
and of which the Romans were so fond.
79 De Oratore, II, 61. Itvult etiam ••• in rebus gestis declarari
non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo ••• 1f

80
because of its detailed descriptions of battles.

The reality

of his conquest is increased for the reader by frequent passages
like the description of the British war-chariots,80 the besieging of the Gallic fortifications,8l and
the palisades at Ale9*
sia. 82

He was not content to tell us that he crossed the Rhine

but gave a full engineer's report of the bridge which he built
for that purpose. 83

Such details alone· would make the work far

more than the mere listing of the number of his enemies and the
bold account of his victories.

More important, however, is the

success with which Caesar has fulfilled this norm of telling
guo modo quid actum aut dictum !1! by the general impression
whimh the reader gets from the work A! A whole.

The author was

not, as a matter of fact, too interested in telling the Romans
that Gaul was conquered.

They all knew that.

But he was par-

ticularly interested in telling them that Gaul was conquered
through the speed and statesmanship of the Roman commander. 84
So often does the word celeritas occur in the Commentaries,85

80 B.Q. IV, 33.
81 ~.G. VII, 22.
82 Ibid., 72.
83 B.G., IV, 17. The passage is a difficult and concise bi~ of
Latin and shows Caesar's skill in handling the language.
84 Edwards, xii, xiv.
85 B.Q., I, 10,13,38,54; II, 3.12; III, 29; IV, 14; V, 11.

,
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that he who misses this point in the history of Caesar misses
the secret of his success not only in the conquest of Gaul but
in the Civil War as well. 8S
After the historian has shown tht --Significance of the va.rious actions and the method by which these actions were carried
out, it remains for him to state the retults of those actions.
And in so doing, he is to explain whether the results are the
work of chance, foresight, or recklessness, to mention a few
possibilities. 8? Now it is obvious that the conquest of Gaul
was portrayed by Caesar as the result of his singular foresight,
and it would take too long to cite the references by whioh he
manages to keep

~his

prominently before the reader's mind.

But

were there not other causes whioh contributed to the conquest of
Gaul?

Why did Caesar's enemy fail to achieve a result propor-

tionate to its courage?
Commentaries?
not explicitly.

Can we find the answer to this in the

Some, at least, of the reasons are stated, though
First of all, the Gauls had to contend with a
f

great general and a great statesman.

Secondly, they were being

8S "But Pompey's plan of oampaign, though excellent, was unsuccessful. His failure was mainly due to the astonishing activity, speed, and resoluteness of his rival. 1I
Rostovtzeff, II, 141.
8? ~ Oratore, II, 61. "vult etiam ••• et cum eventu dicatur, ut
causae explicantur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeri tat is ••• It
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led against an equally brave but better disciplined army.

Third

and most important of all, the Gauls were a fickle people and
despite all their courage, they could never hold on long to one
course or pOlicy.88

If we seek then .the causes for the conquest
••
of Gaul, the answer is had in the generalship of Caesar, the
courage of his army, and the weak (but not cowardly) character
of his foe.
By considering the accounts of a few of the battles, we may

see that Caesar put into practice the Ciceronian principle of
stating causes in the minor incidents of his work as well.

For

instance, he blames the defeat of Titurius and Cotta on the
temerity of the former in leading the army out of camp on the
mere word of the enemy.89

When relating the attack of the
~

88

IV, 5. Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant, et quid quisque eorum
de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit, quaerant, et mercatores
in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibusque regionibus veniant
quasque ibi res cognoverint, pronuntiare oogant. His rebus
atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia
,
ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio poenitere necesse est, cum
incertis rumoribus serviant et plerique ad voluntatem eorum
ficta respondeant."
Cf. also B.G. IV, 13. " ••• et cognita Gallorum infirmitate,
quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent
conseout1, sentiebat."
89 B.G., V, 52. " ••• quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati
sit aoceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum dooet ••• "
~.Q.
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Sugumbri on Quintus Clcero, he blames hls lleutenant for carelessness ln sendlng men out to forage ln dangerous

clrcumstance~

but he goes to great lengths to ascrlbe the defeat to fortune or accldent, as we would interpret it~~O

The first dlvlslon of

the Helvetlans to suffer defeat at the hands of Caesar was the
canton of the Tlgurlnl whlch had once slaln Plso, a relatlve of
hls.

But he dld not clalm to have fore\een the fittlngness of

thls retrlbutlon.

Instead he slmply says that lt bad come about

elther through chance or by the provldence of the immortal
gods. 9l
It is evident from Cicero's last norm for historical presentation that he does not wish events to be narrs.ted impersonally as though they happened independently of the characters
involved.

For he says explicitly that the life and manners of
the main characters, at least, are to be described. 92 And on

this score, too, Caesar must receive our favorable vote.

Al-

though he is himself the most prominent character in the Gallic
f

Wars, he is careful not to pass over the signiflcance of his

90 B.Q., VI, 42. " ••• multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit."
91 ~.Q., I, 12. "Ita sive casu sive consill0 deorum immortalium,
quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo
Romano lntulerat, ea princeps poenas persolvit."
92 ~ Oratore, II, 61. "hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae,
sed etiam, qul fama et nomine excellant, de cujusque vita
atque natura ••• II
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opponents.

We have already spoken of his descriptions of the

Gallic character as a contributing cause to their ultimate defeat.

There are besides frequent references to their curiosity9
and skill in imitation. 94 The sixth ~o~k contains the famous
comparison between the Gauls and the Germans. 95 How often does

Caesar attribute the decline of Gaul to the infiltration of
traders,96 and the supremacy of the Rhi~-dwelling tribes to the
proximity of the Germans who kept their neighbors in a hardy
spirit by the constant threat of invasion?97

His account of the

character of the Nervii is a sample of his procedure when preparing to report another conquest of his more difficult enemies. 98 Another example is the two paragraph passage devoted to
the customs of the Suebi, Who have the significant trait of desiring as much untenanted land on their borders as possible. 99

93 B. G. IV, 5.
94 BeG., VII, 22. "Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia
cuiusque modi Gallorum occurebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab
quoque traduntur, aptissimum. H
95 !!..G., VI, 11-24.
96 B.G., II, 15. "Nullum aditum esse ad aos mercatoribus: nihil
pati vinireliquarumque rerum inferri, quod iis rebus relanguescere animos ••• et remitti virtutem eXistimarent; esse
homines feros magnaeque virtutis, increpitare atque incuaare
reliquos Belgas ••• "
97 B.G., II, 4.
98 B.G., 11,15, 27.
99 BoG., IV, 3. "Publice maximam put ant esse laudem, quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari , magnum
numerum civitatumsuam vim sustineri non posse."

,
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Leaders of particular importance come in for special mention.

Caesar, for example, gives a good deal of attention to

Dumnorix, the Aeduan, who was popular, openhanded, and as ambi-

....

tious for primacy in the state as was,. the Roman himself .100
Another leading figure is Ariovistus whose speechlOl reveals a
'

resolute leader of a proud people, and emphasizes the danger of
that struggle which forms the subject
first Commentary.

0' the second half of the

No wonder the Romans were signing their wills

in the camp and weeping uncontrollably before the battle!102
Of a third hero, Vercingetorix, we need only say that his reputation as the champion of French independence has been won for
him only through the pages of Caesar.
There are,too, in addition to these names of greater
importance, about ninety-three "minor characters" in the Gallic
Wars. l03 This is a surprisingly large number for a relatively

100

~.G.,

1,9, l8i V, 6. "Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix, de quo
ante ••• dictum est ••• eum cupidum rerum novaruM, cupidum impe- ,
rii, magni animi, magnae ••• auctoritatis .....
101 B.Q., 1,36. "neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse.
Cum vellet, congrederetur: intellecturum, quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis. qui inter annos XIV tectum
non subissent, virtute possent."
•
102 ~., 39. "Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas
tenere poterant: abditi ln tabernaculls aut suum fatum quaerebantur aut oum famlllarlbus suls oommune perioulum mlserabantur. Volgo totis castris testamenta obslgnabantur."
Thls scene, ls one of the most human of the many slmllar
ones related ln tbe Commentarles.
103 Edna Klrk, "Mlnor Roles ln Caesar's Drama," Classioal
Journal, XXX, (1934-5), 339.

short work.
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What is more surprising, many of these characters

are pictured in a way to be long remembered.

We have, for ins-

tance, the general who "had reported to him as seen that which
he had not seen."104

This gives a h~~ous touch to the narra-

tive and incidentally, shows (without

Cae~ar

having to draw the

moral) how uncertain are the fortunes of war, when a trusted
aide could fail his general by letting 'he imagination play
tricks on him.

Other of these minor figures have been mentioned

in the preceed1ng chapter as an argument for Caesar's impartial1ty.105

Such care 1n dep1cting
those who played both inciden!

tal and prominent parts in the story of his conquest has been,
we think, a factor contribut1ng greatly to the popularity of
Caesar's Commentaries.
~nimaginative

For in them the thoughtful and not too

reader will find a true-to-life description of a

real struggle of a dying nation against a ris1ng empire, and
from that story will be able to find many a parallel for the
events of subsequent centuries.

That is another reason why h1s

work has surv1ved, while that of most of his predecessors has
fallen into ob11vion.

104 B.G. I, 22. "Caesar cognovit •.• Considium, timore perterri"tum, quod non vidisset, pro viso sibi renuntiasse."
105 21. pp. 35-36 above.
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Because so little of Roman history is extant, it is hard to
say exactly how far Caesar surpassed his
various qualities considered above.
Wars conforms very closely to the
the De Oratore.

predecess~rs

in all the

But, at any rate, his Gallic

nor~established

by Cicero in

For this literary (as well as military and

political) genius realized what was needed to make Roman history
live and wrote accordingly.

Consequentfy, when DeWitt says of

his work, "there is no rhetorical elaboration, no philosophical
interpretation of events, no dramatic scheme, no evaluation of
larger historical issues,u l06 he is speaking a truth, but only a
half-truth.
We come now to the second division of Cicero's recommendationa for artistic history.

For as a conclusion to his descrip-

tion of the ideal historical composition, he makes a reference
to the proper historical style.

~

The reference, despite its bre-

vity, concerns the most important point of all in his eyes.
Consider the prominence it holds in all his previous criticism
of the Roman historians, both in the De Oratore, where he treats
history formally, and in the occasional references to it in the
remainder of the oratorical works.

Thus a general descript10n

106 DeWitt, "Non-Political Nature ••• " 348.
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of the historians of Cato's time is Qui sine ullis ornamentis
monumentasolum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque reliquerunt ••• et dum intelligatur quid'dicant, unam dicendi laudem pu107
tant esse brevitatem.
According to.fits tastes, ipse etiam
Piso ••• religuit ••• annales sane exiliter scriptos ••• 108 And after admitting that Antipater paulum se erexit et addidit maiorem

•

historiae sonum voci, he adds ceteri non exornatores rerum, sed
tantummodo narratores fuerunt. 109 Moreover, even the power of
Antipater was sine nitore ac palaestra. 110
Such being the unfortunate reality, what, we ask, was Cicero's ideal historical style?

The brief reference in the

~

Oratore:
••• verborum autem ratio et genus orationis
fusum atque tractatum et cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudicali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensibus aculeis persequendum est.lll
is clear enough and its precepts are veIl exemplified by Caesar's GalliC Wars.

107
108
109
110
111

A difficulty presents itself, however, if we ,

De Oratore, 11,54.
Brutus, 106.
De Oratore, 11,54.
De Legibus, I, 6.
De Oratore, 11,64.

•
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consider two other passages in the Orator where Cicero speaks of
ornateness as a characteristic of the historical style.

In one

of these passages, after describing the over-ornate style ot the
Sophists, Cicero adds:
Ruic generi historia finitima est. In qua et
narratur ornate et regio saepe aut pugna describltur; interponuntur etiam contiones et
hortationes. Sed in his trac~a quaedam et
fluens expetltur, non haec co~orta et acris
oratl0. Ab his non multo secus quam a poetls
haec eloquentia quam quaerimus sevocanda est. 112
And speaking ln another passage ot the kind ot narrative proper
to the oration, he says narrationes credlbiles ~ historico sed
prope cotidiano sermone explicatae dilucide. 113 Now just what
kind of ornateness this implies it is hard to say.

For it is

distinguished from the ornate style of political oratory as well
as trom the legalistic style of the courtroom.

Our difficulty

is increased when we find Cicero concluding his praise of Cae- ,.
saris Commentaries with the statement that nihil est enim in
historia pura !1 lllustri brevitate dulCius. 114
f

There seems to be a contradiction here, but we think that
the following plausible interpretation will save Cicero's
•

112 Orator, 66.
113 Ibid., 124.
114 Brutus, 262.
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consistency.

Whenever he speaks of ornamentation as a charac-

teristic of the historical style, he is simply stating an established fact.

But when it is a question of giving a positive

.

recommendation of the style best sui t.eq.... to historical literature,
'

he either omits mention of the need of ornament (as in the passage from the De Oratore just quoted) or at least he fails to
stress it.

For ornamentation was not s~ crying a need in Roman

history as a certain rhythm and cadence and flow of language.
What Cicero does stress, therefore, is the need of that smooth
and flowing style which was his own oontribution to Latin oratory and an improvement which he
duce into Roman history as well.

WB-S

probably anxious to intro-

Provided this was obtained, he

was probably indifferent to the presence or absence of ornamentation.

Consider his praise of Caesar1s Commentaries:
Vald.e, quidem, inquam probandos; nudi enim
sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationie tamquam veste detracta. Sed dum voluit
alios habere parata, unde sumerent qui vellent scribere historiam, ineptis gratum
fortasse fecit, qui illa volent calamistris
inurere, san~s quidem homines a scribendo
deterruit ••• 15

How else may we explain his enthusiastic reception of this work
in the same passage in which he remarks their terseness and bare
ness, except by saying that they fulfill his essential norm for

-

115 Ibid., 207.
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fine historical composition - a smooth and flowing style?
often does he insist on this quality?

His criticism of the his-

tory of Antipater is neque ••• tractu orationis
perpolivit illud opus. 116

How

~

et aequabili

In our chi~t text from the ~ Oratore

we again have the words genus orationis fusum atque tractum et
~

lenitate quadam aequabiliter proflu,ns.

In the Orator it is

said of histories in his tracta quaedam et fluens expetitur.117
Later in the same work this recommendation is more explicitly
stated !g historia ••• placet omnia dici Isocrateo Theopompeoque
~ ~

circumscriptione ambituque, ut tamquam in orbe inclusa

currat oratio, quod insistat in singulis perfectis absolutisque
sententiis. 118

Undoubtedly, Cicerots main desire was this

smooth and easy flow.

Ornamentation was only incidental.

Now

let us show that this main desire was fulfilled by Caesar in
Gallic

t~

~.

Practically all the commentators praise this work for its
terseness, purity of diction,

~~d

freedom from ornamentation.

This is not surprising since Caesar was a member of the Atticist
school - a group which made profession of these

literary
•

116 De Oratore, II,
117 OTator, 66.
118 Ibid., 207.

54.
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qualities.

But it would be wrong to think that the presence of

these characteristics

~

ipso demands the absence of rhythm.

Such indeed was the common result in the products of inferior
workmen of Caesar's own school.

Thi~. ~s

the author we are now considering.
Caesarian period.

~~

not true, however, ot

There is such a thing as the

While it is not, of course, as elaborate as

that of Livy or of Cicero himself, it wbuld more than satisfy
the demands of the latter as they are expressed in his rhetorical works.

Since there are various ways of attaining smoothness

of style, Cicero, as a literary critic, would be the last to attempt to cast the diverse geniuses of men into the same mould.
What, we may ask, were the particular devices of which Caesar
made use in attaining smoothness in his own style?
Before answering this question let us first consider the
nature of Caesar's problem.

It is the same as that of every

writer of historical narrative and is summed up very well for us
by J.J.Schlicher: -One of the chief problems of historical writing is how to present the separate events or acts which make up
a situation in such a way as to present their sequence in time
and also to show their relations to one another and their
ative importance.- 119

~el

So, as an advance over -the blunt and

119 J.J.Schlicher, "The Development of Caesar's Narrative
Style,· Classical Philology, XXXI, (1936), 212.

,

.'
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monotonous sentences of the earlier annalists, "120 prose writers
in the half century preceding Caesar had added to a "dominant
verb" various subord1nate clauses or phrases to express the relations of the events contributing

t~\pe

main aotion.

We rea-

lize, then, that Caesar was not starting something new, but was
oonsoious1y perfeoting a development that had already begun •

•

Acoording to Soh1icher "in a total of about 2,530 narratlve
sentenoes in Caesar we flnd some 2,170 domlnant verbs, eaoh preoeded by one or more phrases or olauses express1ng pre11minary
or oontemporary events or oiroumstances."121

As a partlcu1ar1y

skillful example of this practice we mlght examlne one of the
perlods found ln Book II of the Ga111c Wars.

Some Gauls had

deserted to the Nervl1 from Caesar's camp and had proposed to
the former a plan of attacklng Caesar's army while on the maroh.
Adiuvabat etlam eorum consl1ium qui rem deferebant, quod Nervll antlquitus, cum equitatu
nihil possent (neque enlm ad hoc tempus el
rei student, sed quioquid possunt, pedestribus valent copils), quo faol1ius finltimorum
equltatum, si praedandi oausa ad eos venlssent,
lmpedirent, tenerls arborlbus inolsis atque
inf1exis crebrlsque in 1atltudinem ramis enatis et rubis sentibusque interieotis effeoerant, ut instar muri hae saepes munimenta
•
praeberent quo non modo ~~n intrari, sed ne
1
perspioi quidem posset.

120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 212-213.
122 B.G., II, 17.

f
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In this passage the dominant verb is effeoerant, although it is
not the main verb grammatioally.

What are some of the oontri-

buting oiroumstanoes expressed by the subordinate olauses?
of all, we are told that the proposal.,

~f

~~

Firs

the deserters was par-

tioularly favorable to the Nervii praotioe of ambusoade.

Anothe

olause tells us that the Nervii usually resorted to this method
beoause of their weakness in oavalry.

• short parenthesis oom-

ments on the oontinuanoe of this weakness among the armed foroes
of that tribe.

Quo faoilius ..• impedirent states the purpose of

the partioular ambush about to be desoribed.

The ablative ab-

solute desoribes the oonstruotion of the oamouflage.

Quo non

modo •.• posset states the final effeot of the devioe of the enemy. All these faots Caesar has expressed in one sentenoe, made
up of one substantive, one ooordinate and six subordinate olauses, and one ablative absolute.

When translating this sentenoe -

for the Loeb edition of the Gallio

~,

H.J.Edwards finds it

neoessary to use two sentenoes.
One of the dangers, however, in the use of this struoture
is that too many subordinate olauses tend to overwork a period
and thus impede that very smoothness and even flow of
whioh they are intended to seoure.
of this.

word~

Caesar, too, was oonsoious

As the work prooeeds, there is an inorease in the

substitution of the partioipial oonstruotion.

While this served

the same essential purpose of expressing oontributing

,

r

.'
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circumstances, it was more effective in securing Cicero's even
flow than the more"self-sufficient subordinate clause or even
the ablative absolute with its own subject and predicate elements."123

Thus in a later book of )~e Gall~c Wars we have the

following passage:
Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum
nacti hostes loco depellunt;.fugientes usque
ad frumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestr1bus
cOP.iis consederat, persequuntur compluresque
interficiunt. l24
where Caesar uses two participles to express circumstances for
which in the early books he might have employed a subor.dinate
clause.
These are the chief means which Caesar uses in securing his
smoothness of style.

Of the use of the coordinating conjunction

to divide the load of the period there are only two hundred and
sixty five cases in

~

of Caesar; of the continuing relative

...

clauses, one hundred and fifty three cases in the Gallic Wars;
and of the

circumstantial clause only about a dozen examples
in each of his two works. 125 But in view of his mastery of the
~

periodic sentence, the substitution of participles for

123 Schlicher, 219.
124 B.G., VII, 67.
125 Again Schlicher is my authority for these figures, 219-21.

?
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subordinate olauses, the frequent use of the ablative absolutel 2
and at least the realization of the usefulness of other devices,
we may say that Caesar not only showed signs of the progress of
Latin historioal style, but marked such an attainment in this
.~

lirie, that his work today is considered worthy of serving as a
model for the young student of Latin in acquiring a command of
a clear, elegant, and smooth prose stylt.

,
•

126 A frequent use of the ablative absolute in Caesar is after
the dominant verb. Tacitus frequently uses this devioe.

CHAPTER V
THE FIRST ROMAN LITERARY HISTORY
Now that we have concluded

test~.ng

.......

the Gallic Wars accor-

ding to the norms of Ciceronian criticism, we are prepared to
state openly that which we only hinted at in the first chapter
of this thesis.

It is that this work dr Caesar constitutes the

first Roman literary history.

A brief review of the steps lead-

ing to this conclusion will be helpful.

We began the discussion

by notlng that progress ln Roman historiography by the middle of
the first century B.C. did not correspond with the developments
ln other literary fields,

The brief review of Roman history

which was contained in the second chapter showed that this neglect was due to both scientific and artistic neglect.

We could,

then, understand Cicero's discouragement and his reasons for
proposing an ideal for historlcal oomposition.

-

Our third ohap-

ter analyzed this ideal whioh demanded both artistio and scientiflc lmprovements, with more emphasls, however, on the former.
Acoordingly, the fourth chapter considered the credibllity of
the Gallio Wars and decided that the more probable oonolusion
•

is that it constitutes a falr and aoourate aocount of a great
Roman military venture.

Next, the fifth chapter revealed that

by a close (but probably unconscious) observance of Ciceronian
norms for an effective presentation, Caesar had produced an

f

.
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artistic history.

Now then, unless we are prepared to say that

these norms of Cicero do not form a worthy literary ideal, it
follows that Caesar has been the first of the Romans to write
a real history.
These norms, as has been said, do not present the highest
literary ideal.

Yet as the Gallic --,
Wars proves, their observance

would do much to remedy the unreliability and baldness of all
the previous Roman attempts and would result in a production apt
to attract more than the professional scholar.

It is, there-

fore, no argument against this thesis to say that Sallust was a
more artistic historian than Caesar.

We did not state that Cae-

sar was the most artistic historian among the Romans but rather
the first artistic historian, because his work preceded the
Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum Jugurthinum by at least ten
years.

,..

Moreover, though we readily concede the palm to Sallust

for his artistic merits, the opinion of his reliability is not
at all as certain as it is in the case of Caesar.
of

In the words

J.C.Rolfe~

Nevertheless, judged by modern standards, the
Jugurtha is rather like an historical novel
of the better oaass than like sober history.
Chronology is to a great extent disregarded,
and in place of exact dates we have such vague
expressions as "interea," "iisdem temporibus,"
Ilpaucos post annos," and the like. Sallust
even ventures upon shifts in the sequence of
events, in order to make a better rounded tale.

As ~ literary masterpiece the work takes
high ~.I
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But we insist that accuracy is the more essential"requirement in
this branch of literature. 2

Therefore, since the work of Caesar

meets the demands of both science an~~art, it conforms more perfectly to the norms of Cicero and, in fact, to all sensible estimation of historical worth.

It is

t~e

first credible and

artistic Roman history.
One difficulty remains.

We said in the introductory chap-

ter that we would not consider it a refutation of our position
if Cicero failed to mention explicitly that the Commentaries
were an answer to his hopes.

Our reason for stating thiS,

though only a conjecture, is very conformable to Cicero's character.

The De Oratore in which he recalled the deficiencies of

Roman history-writing and in which he established his own norms
for the improvement of that branch, was published in 55.

The

6allic Wars which conform closely to those norms was published
about five years later.

But in that part of the Brutus (written'

in 46) where Cicero enthusiastically praises Caesar's work, he
•

1 Sallust, Bellum Catilinae and Bellum Iugurthinum, edt and

transl. by J.C.Rolfe, Putnam's, New York, 1929, xv.
(Italics mine).
2 It is true that the modern trend is to give Sallust more credit for accuracy and objectivity than was formerly the case •
.Qf. T.R.Broughton, "Was Sallust Fair to Cicero?".!m,
'
LXVII, (1936), 35.
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fails to state that at last Roman history had met his requirements
and definitely entered this field of literature.

In view of his

dejection at the poor performance of past historians, we would
expect him to be only too glad to

ma,e~this

admission.

This is

our explanation of the omission.

When Cicero established his

norms in 55, he could not know that Caesar was to be the first
Roman to conform to them.

Now althougt Caesar was a friend of

Cicero he was not only a literary rival but a member of the famous
Atticists, a school diametrically opposed to Cicero's own teachings.

That the only really worth-while representative of that

school had produced a fine example of terse and elegant expression
Cicero could not fail to recognize.

Nor will anyone deny that he

outdid himself in praising his rival's success.

But perhaps he

thought it beyond the bounds of strict justice or the rquirements
of courteous rivalry to go any further.

In other words he wou!d

not explicitly admit that the norms which he had set down in 55
were first applied with success by a member of an opposing school.
From the generous praise bestowed upon the author let others draw
the very probable conclusion of his own mind which he felt under
no oblfgation to express himself.

.'

Now this is just what we have done in the thesis.

We have

made the inference which Cicero would not, we think, deny.
that inference is, we repeat, that the Commentaries

~

And

!a! Gallic

!!£! not only mark a literary advance but in themselves comprise

a masterpiece.
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It is, then, not a sentimental custom that has

inflicted this work on the resisting schoolboy,

~ut

the well-

founded opinion of students of Latin that with this work,
..• we seem to see the trao~ormation of a striotly professional account of warfare in which only
the army and its aohievements in the mass and the
general's strategy were important, into something
like history.:3

••

-

:3 Schlicher, 224.
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